

# Vague Realization

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Vagueness is a characteristic of language/thought, but it is not there in the world. The reason is that language and thought are normativity bound, whereas the metaphysical world by itself is not normativity based. This has an impact upon the working of the type/token distinction. Types, such as mental state types, are vague, for they are abstract depository of an abundance of possibilities, say of possible specific instantiations of the type in question. Types are themselves naturalistically instantiated as dispositional states, which are neither static nor atomistic. They inhabit a dynamical multi dimensional cognitive landscape, which allows them, through categorization means, to situate the constantly incoming information to the system into a relevant point at that landscape's incline. Types' vague abstract possibilities impact succeeds through the usage of holistic dynamical properties of the morphological content's morphological operativeness, with the aim of relevantly situating the token in focus upon the landscape, by the means of abductive hypothesis to the best explanation concerning incoming data. At the middle level of the dynamical system's description, the total cognitive state which the epistemic agent entertains at that time, gets situated as a non-dimensional point at the multi dimensional landscape. The realization of this token mental total cognitive state is non-vague, because it is conscious and phenomenologically experienced by the cognitive agent: it is something which succeeds in the world. So types are abstract and vague, whereas tokens are non-vague events in the world. Tokened total cognitive states of an agent at a time follow a relevant settlement into what we call referential zero point, thus instantaneous to-the-point centering. This phenomenological experience conscious first person point of view is wrongly pursued as separatism inspired externalist reference semantic project. Such a move tries to establish an objective relation without conscious experiential phenomenology support, which is a partial zombie enterprise. Reasons for the so-called referential tokening are not appreciated, given that the impact is upon the space of causes. Appreciation is needed, which comes from operativeness of mental type reasons, as they chromatically illuminate the conscious scene. Types then stay vague, whereas tokens are realized in a non-vague metaphysical manner in the world.

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## 1. Vagueness

Vagueness is a characteristic of language/thought, but it is not there in the world. The reason is that language and thought are normativity bound, whereas the metaphysical world by itself is not normativity based.

Vagueness is a benign logical incoherence phenomenon, coming out of mutually unsatisfiable semantic requirements, individualistic and collectivistic ones, in as far as these are forthcoming in the sorites paradox settings. Individualistic demands urge you to recognize the same value of neighboring items, whereas collectivist view upon the overall situation disagrees with this. Vagueness is an adaptability enabling characteristics. We call our approach to vagueness *transvaluationism*, echoing thereby the Nietzschean *Ueberwertung*

*aller Werte*, i.e. disciplining of logical values and of supervaluationism.

Meinongians think that vagueness is there in the world, and that each of the multiple existing objects is vague. We do not think that there are multiple objects in the world to start with, for we defend a form of ontological monism, promoting just one object, the world, which we call Bobject. Despite that this world is dynamic, it cannot be vague, for the normativity independent existing world just cannot be based on normative requirements, even less upon the mutually incompatible and incoherent ones. We use a lump of jello as an illustration of one dynamical object without parts.

Language and thought, on the other hand, are well normativity based, and so they are vague. As we have said, mutually unsatisfiable semantic requirements form the basis of language/thought. Whatever you say or think may be vaguely interpreted, as you know from your experience.

As we have hinted already: individualistic normative standards try to secure impeccable passage from one item to the next, whereas collectivistic standards happen to clash with them.

## 2. Type/token distinction.

Language/thought vagueness and the world's non-vague nature exercises an impact upon the working of the type/token distinction.

Type/token distinction appears to have something to do with vagueness of language/thought and with non-vague nature of the world, as we recognize it. Russell famously said that dog-type doesn't bark, whereas Max, Oscar and Buddy, each of them certainly does his barking. These friendly creatures that bark are recognized as inhabitants of the world. There is a seeming complication here, since we claim that there are no parts there besides the existence of a very rich dynamical world. But we can perhaps circumvent this by saying that the world behaves region-ishly in Max-barking manner as we say that Max barks. Now, these creatures are tokens, and since they ex-sist in the world, they have to be non-vague, given that their existence does not depend upon normative pressures. On the other hand, *types* which don't bark, as we realize, may be seen as kinds of abstraction, and then they can be recognized as dependent upon normative pressures which underpin the ex-sistence of language/thought in the world. And so types may be seen as being *vague*. This should be sufficient for our exercise, and we leave aside the thorny question of language/though inhabiting the world. Now switch from dogs to colors. Whereas red is a color *type* which certainly is vague as it allows for a rich variation of nuances, specific *tokens* of red22, red417 and so on are non-vague in each of their appearances. And your *phenomenological experience* of each of these tokens is something specifically non-vague, as opposed to your grasp of the vague red *type*. So it really seems that vagueness of language/thought and non-vague nature of the world may have an impact upon the type/token distinction.

## 3. Vague types.

Types, such as mental state types, are vague, for they are abstract depository of an abundance of possibilities, say of possible specific instantiations of the type in question.

Some more words need to be said about the *vague* nature of *types*. Take the mental state type red. As we said, it abstractly inhabits the already mentioned specific *tokens* of red22, red417, and many more. In fact, the mental *type* red involves almost innumerable instantiations of specific *tokens* of red. Each of these tokens, if (mentally) experienced, will come with

specific unique *phenomenological experiential quality*, different from any of other phenomenally experienced token instances of red. This quality will be experienced, but not necessarily becoming aware or being represented. But types, such as mental type red, are *vague*, for they are actually an abstract depository of so many possible specific instantiations of the type in question. We may wish to leave aside the difficult question about the phenomenological experience of the type red. It may be specific in respect to one's experience of the concept type blue. Trying a way out, we quickly say that we shifted from types red and blue to their common type *color*, in respect to which these figure as *tokens* now.

#### 4. Dispositional instantiation.

Types are themselves naturalistically instantiated as dispositional states that are neither static nor atomistic.

*Types* are *dispositional* states, and this is what their naturalistic instantiation specificity may come to. It is natural to think that whatever is dispositionally stored in our memory needs to be kind of *abstract*, and in this way it may help us in the variability of encounters with specific *tokens* in our everyday experiences. There is a need for abstraction here, which is a characteristic of language/thought.

There is a well entrenched tradition however which treats dispositional states as something *static* and *atomistic*, neither of which is actually the case. The reason for such treatment is to be searched in the wish to have *tractable rules* involving means to deliver an account of dispositional content. *Propositional* treatment of dispositional mental state types is a widespread practice. These atomistic dispositional contents are then further treated as being *static* in their nature. This would account for their power of abstract application to various specific cases. But it goes astray of the *dynamical* ongoing adaptation of the cognitive system to the incoming information, always causing disturbance but as well enabling adaptation to the environment, in view of the *relevant* response search for each variability in the situation at hand. Some *vagueness* is required for this, and it is to be found in dispositionally instantiated types.

#### 5. Dynamical landscape relevant positioning.

Types inhabit a dynamical multidimensional cognitive landscape, which allows them, through categorization means, to situate the constantly incoming information to the system into a relevant point at that landscape's incline.

Where are content-types stored? It is natural to think that they inhabit a multidimensional cognitive landscape. Each cognizer has a lot of knowledge stored in her cognitive background. This background has many dimensions, say 10.000 dimensions, which come in a *structured* manner. Once a content is stored in that multidimensional landscape, its positioning there has some consequences, similarly as it has consequences for you if you live in the city right now, or in the forest, or if you are close to the seashore, involving nature and other inhabitants in the way how you are accepted and how you manoeuvre your everyday engagements. In related manner the shape of the background cognitive landscape exercises its impact upon how the dispositionally stored content will behave in the conditions of adapting to the information incoming to the system. Similarly, the paths upon the landscape which have been repeatedly used from point A to point B and then to point C will have more attraction power in settling the incoming information as this is the case for narrower venues. The mountainous or flatland character of the landscape will exercise its impact.

Dispositional type contents help in the task of the incoming information

categorization. The shape of the landscape will make this less or more complicated or direct a job. There will be attraction basins at the landscape, and some mountainous terrain which will impede smooth advance towards the goal. There is a tendency here however to situate the incoming information, with the help of the background dispositional content peculiarities, onto the *relevant* point at the landscape's incline, the attraction point given the situatedness affordances typical to this specific background multidimensional landscape. The information keeps on constantly coming to the system, and even in its reposing time cognitive memory and estimation wheels keep on turning, searching for what may be relevant for a possible agentive engagement.

## 6. Holism and abduction

Types' vague abstract possibilities impact succeeds through the usage of holistic dynamical properties of the morphological content's morphological operativeness, with the aim of relevantly situating the token in focus upon the landscape, by the means of abductive hypothesis to the best explanation concerning incoming data.

As we say that types inhabit multidimensional dynamical landscape, this implies that they may go in several directions. They may be a repository for a multiplicity of possible token instantiations. In order for this to be possible, the background multidimensional landscape system needs to work in a *holistic* manner. This means that each information or stored dispositional content may be in principle related to any other information in that system. And there will be some systematic handling of such matters. These are what Fodor called isotropic and Quineian characteristics of holistic systems. Now, the content which is stored in the cognitive background is not just dispositional as we call it up till now, but it is actually content with a specific dispositional behavior that may be called *morphological content*. The name morphology refers to the shape, and here it is the content complying to the *shape* of the earlier described multidimensional cognitive background involving *landscape*. The morphologically stored dispositional contents thus behave in a *morphologically operative* manner, following the attractive and repulsive characteristics of the landscape in question. The aim of this procedure is to relevantly situate the incoming information into the *relevant* position that will be poised to semantic or agentive agency. This is achieved by the help of the *abductive* hypothesis to the best explanation settlement upon the landscape. The cognitive system is always in search of the settlement into the *relevant* position, given the changing circumstances to which it needs to adapt.

## 7. Total cognitive state.

At the middle level of the dynamical system's description, the total cognitive state which the epistemic agent entertains at that time, gets situated as a non-dimensional point at the multi dimensional landscape.

The content into which the cognitive system settles is that of *total cognitive state* (TCS), such as this one appears in the attention of the cognizer at a time. This TCS may itself be a quite complex matter, consisting of several content-constituents, which may perhaps be called content's properties. One can think of the cognitive categories, consisting of several properties, such as the bird nesting in trees, flying and so on. These are certainly defeasible properties, for chicken may also be recognized as a kind of bird.

The important thing here is that TCS may be seen as situated at the *upper* level of the cognitive system's description. But this upper level would have no situatedness, no real meaning, without the support at the *middle* level of the dynamic cognitive system's

description. Here is the entire background that supports the meaning, the understanding of what appears at the upper level, and precisely this dynamical multidimensional level consists of what may be called the *narrative background* support of what is realized and understood at the upper TCS involving level. But notice that this TCS point at the *upper* level of the cognitive system's description is realized as a *point*, a *non-dimensional* point, at the multi-dimensional dynamical landscape, narrativity support environment, at the middle level of the cognitive system's description.

## 8. Nonvague conscious token.

The realization of token mental total cognitive state is non-vague, because it is conscious and phenomenologically experienced by the cognitive agent: it is something which succeeds in the world.

TCS or Total Cognitive State is realized at the *upper* level of the cognitive dynamical system, we have said. So TCS is in the focus of the cognizer's conscious attention. It is conscious (although not necessarily reflexively conscious) and it is *phenomenologically experienced* by the cognitive agent. TCS is something which succeeds in the world. It is a realization of a *token* mental cognitive state, which may be an outcome of several dispositional content types effectiveness. Despite this, as it succeeds in the world, it is *non-vague*. And this non-vagueness is exactly forthcoming through the *phenomenological experience*.

## 9. Vague categorization

So types are abstract and vague, whereas tokens are non-vague events in the world. Tokens of cognitive contents, such as TCS's, are non-vague events in the world, supported in this through their *phenomenal experience*. Types, on the other hand, are abstract and vague. They dispositionally inhabit multi-dimensional cognitive background narrativity providing and understanding enabling landscape. The vague dispositional nature of types enables their possible multiple and adaptive realization. Situated in the landscape, they are poised to go in many directions, one of which will be chosen given the holistic and abductive proceedings following circumstances. The literature concerning psychological categories deals with such abstract categorization matters.

## 10. Referential zero point.

Tokened total cognitive states of an agent at a time follow a relevant settlement into what we call referential zero point, thus instantaneous to-the-point centering. Following levels of the cognitive system's description, we realized that Total Cognitive State is whatever cognizer phenomenologically consciously experiences at a moment in time, supported through the multidimensional narrative holistic dynamical cognitive system as it appears at the middle level of the cognitive system's description. (The lower level of the cognitive system's description is that of implementation, which we just quickly mention here.) The non-vague phenomenological centering at the TCS in an instant is what is centered at from the cognizer's engaged agentive conscious perspective, from his *zero point*. The agent experiences whatever he centers at cognitively as something that belongs to *his* experiences, as happening from the zero point perspective. It is not something which would be experienced objectively, from the third person point of view perspective. So we can say that tokened total cognitive states at a time follow the relevant settlement into what we call

referential zero point, thus instantaneous to-the-point centering. Notice that such *referential* centering at the TCS would not be possible without the background middle level of cognitive system's description narrative multidimensional background support. The narrative middle level of the cognitive system's description background thus provides conditions for the possibility of such things as referential *directedness*. No directedness without the appropriate narrative support.

## 11. Separatist referential efforts.

This phenomenological experience of conscious referential zero point first person point of view is wrongly pursued as separatism inspired externalist reference semantic project.

We have seen that *directedness* efforts are enabled through the *narrative* background. This however tends to be put under parentheses through the *atomistic* takes upon content, with the promise to come to a *tractable*, surveyable cognitive background. This, by the way, would be classical cognition approach to modelling of mind, as opposed to *dynamical* systems approach which is as we think more adequate. If you go atomist, you do not need any background, such as narrative background, in order to reach a semantic outcome. The *referential* efforts can then be promised to come without *phenomenological experience* support either. One may go externalist, and as far as the epistemic justification is concerned, reliabilist. One may secure reference through causal, or historical chain procedures. One interesting historical example is Russell's logical proper name, which tries to get rid of any descriptive or sense involving elements, all in ending up with zero point directed demonstrative indexical "That!", combined with the pointing gesture. Semantics, we think, is rooted in *narrative background, understanding*. If it means something to you, you have to be able to experience it.

## 12. Lurking partial zombie.

Separatist move tries to establish an objective relation without conscious experiential phenomenology support, which is a partial zombie enterprise.

Separatism tries to achieve its goals through elimination of *experiential phenomenology* from the scene. This would come to an objective kind of relation. Now, creatures without conscious experience engagement, with perhaps referential claims similar to ours, are *zombies*. Partial zombies lurk once the background and thus narration experiential support is withdrawn from our referential efforts.

## 13. Causal dissing of reasons.

Reasons for the so-called referential tokening are not appreciated, given that the impact is upon the space of causes.

Further, if one goes separatist and atomist, say in one's semantic projects, then *reasons* as *normative* stuff will not be taken as being important. Instead of *normative reasons* there will be proposed *causal links* involving approach. But then we find ourselves in the space of causes, and not in the space of reasons, which exactly enables narrative background support of possible *directedness*. Causal dissing of reasons goes along with circumventing phenomenological experience as the basis of possible *directedness*, say semantic or intentional directedness of cognitive content states.

## 14. Appreciation through chromatic illumination.

Appreciation is needed, which comes from operativeness of mental type reasons, by their chromatic illumination of the conscious scene.

In order for semantic directedness to succeed, one needs the support through *reasons*, and these are forthcoming through these reasons exercising their effect upon the occurrent content, being present as features in the experienced consciousness, without being themselves explicitly represented in that consciousness though. The conscious scene, one may say, is chromatically illuminated by reasons from the multidimensional cognitive background dynamical landscape, similarly as there are several reflectors of variable strength and color which cooperate and compete in their ongoing effort to relevantly aesthetically illuminate the occurrent content scene of a theater performance. Your understanding about what goes on in this moment at the scene is supported through the background narrative reasons dispositionally inhabiting the background and illuminating the scene. As said, reasons are *appreciated*, without being *represented*, and this is exactly the manner in which they qualitatively contribute to the directedness semantic, aesthetic or similar value. Appreciation is needed, which comes from operativeness of mental type reasons, by their chromatic illumination of the conscious scene.

## 15. Vague types and nonvague tokens.

Types then stay vague, whereas tokens are realized in a non-vague metaphysical manner in the world.

There is interaction thus between mental types and tokens. Types need to stay vague, so that they can go in several possible directions, given the incoming signal and the shape of the background landscape at which they are positioned in their mutual support and inhibition collective relations. Types are thus potentialities, waiting for their realization. They are vague, so they can be efficient as dispositional potentialities. Whereas complex Total Cognitive States at the upper level of the cognitive system's description come into one's first person perspective phenomenological experience focus, and so they are non-vague.

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