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Narrative directedness journey

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First I engage in an overview of my philosophical itinerary, which clarifies my unique and complex dealing with narrative forces and with directedness, be it referential or intentional. Then, I try to motivate embracing *narrative directedness* approach as against the prevailing atomistic and separatist intentional directedness views.

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1. My philosophical journey: directedness and narration.

My philosophical journey was rich and diversified: in the customary classificatory terms I did work as an analytic philosopher, was acquainted with poststructuralism, and finally embraced what may be called post-analytic philosophy. During all of this time I was attentive in one way or another at the problem of *directedness*, or of *intentionality*, or again at the problem of reference as another strand of directedness in the search for meaning. One may also say that this was a search for *relevance*, for what is relevant or has its meaning in the situation at hand. This was prompted by my interest in Slovene philosophical tradition as elaborated by Veber, where the directedness issue was approached as aiming at an object, and later on as being directed at reality (*zadevanje*). This brought me to the Brentanian roots of intentional directedness studies. I developed interest in ecological psychology, and proposed a mereological essentialist approach to the phenomenon. Then I proposed an international project on phenomenology and cognitive science. And I was lucky to study a dynamical approach to cognition as tied to connectionism and philosophy of psychology. From the side of my parents, both of whom were prolific writers I had an interest in literary environment from my early years, and later I inscribed comparative literature studies; at that time I was influenced by a kind of being-in-the-world of the *Dasein* approach, which is compatible with my later developed ecologist and mereological essentialist leanings. Intentional directedness in this sense is contextualized through worldly engagement concerns, which may be understood as *narrative* engagement. Narration was one characteristic of the linguistic turn that was supported by Lacan and Kristeva approaches at the time. Together with Terry Horgan I developed a dynamical monism or blobjectivist approach, where truth is construed as indirect correspondence, which certainly involves narrative considerations as against atomistic directedness pretensions. With Vojko Strahovnik I engaged in an ethical journey, starting with moral particularism, which embraces reasons holism against atomistic approaches. In recent years I am involved in an epistemology project, where my main discovery is that of *chromatic illumination* by the occurrent content scene through reasons' phenomenal features. Consciousness is basic here, along with the subjective experiential epistemic seemings at the basis of belief formation, and its justification. This is my biographical background of narrative directedness engagement.

In order to explain my vicinity to *narrative* enterprise, I may start with my experiences as a teacher. Some may like my way of explaining things, and others may not be so happy with it. But I have noticed that I really enjoyed narrating a story, or memory of my experiences while teaching. In this way teaching, whatever was good in it, profited from narration, which by the way is quite different from the usual didactical purposes mantra. Narration offers a force to engage one's audience.

By the way, at the beginning of my teaching professor Majer kindly tried to secure a slot for a didactic job that looked to be available at the time, but happily it did not come to fruition. I started teaching at high school in Ljubljana, trying out a shtick that I published in a Verdiglione book. Students enjoyed their freedoms. Later, Jerman secured introductory lectures in philosophy for non-philosophers, such as linguists or history students; there I tried out some Chomsky and philosophy of history, including narration hypothesis. I was elected history of philosophy professor in Zagreb, and started teaching in Zadar, where I tried out such things as P.F. Strawson's kantian approach. Let me mention some important philosophical encounters of mine, which helped me in my narrative enterprise. So I visited Chomsky at MIT and he kindly offered me some of his time to discuss my philosophy of mind ideas. And in Munich, I had occasion to follow a semester of P.F. Strawson's lectures. I repeatedly presented some papers in Wittgenstein Kirchberg am Wechsel symposia, where once I had occasion to have a couple of hours discussion with Goodman; people could not believe it but the reason was that the village was a boring place so the professor took some time for my company. There I also met Chisholm and Haller, Dretske among other people. Hubert Dreyfus agreed to support my Fulbright trial, along with John Haugeland; this later one was chair at one of my Kirchberg presentations. It turned out that my Fulbright proposal was successful with Terry Horgan and John Tienson in Memphis, TN, where I joined a discussion of their Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology book, along with some mathematicians. In Ljubljana, Jerman and Prijatelj established an alfa-beta philosophy and maths discussion group, and Horgan and Tienson joined in the Ljubljana symposium on their book that I later organized. Once I visited John Biro in Gainesville Florida, and Hare was among the listeners of my talk. With Biro I established Bled symposia, where most of the important philosophers participated, such as Sosa and Armstrong, besides my friend U.T. Place and Dancy. Alastair Norcross was inspired and organized his Rocky Mountains Ethics symposia in Boulder CO, where I repeatedly for more than a decade presented papers co-written by Vojko Strahovnik. With him, I also wrote papers that I presented in Pecs Hungary, to such people as Rorty and Habermas, among others. These are some crumbs to indicate the background of my philosophical engagement and narration. Davidson came to Ljubljana through my invitation, as did Lehrer, Chisholm and others. Once I attended an Oxford lecture by Dummett. And I joined Fodor lectures at Rutgers, following my Georges Rey Zadar acquaintance with his modularity thesis. I had a discussion with Quine at the occasion of the Karlovy Vary Meinongian conference, and he wrote me a letter replying to my ontological quest. Timothy Williamson I met in Ljubljana, being acquainted with him and many others from Dubrovnik IUC conferences, where I was a co-organizer with Swain and Pappas. Vogel was there. In Bielefeld I spent some time with Peter Bieri, and in Bayreuth I delivered a lecture to psychologists, following Vossenkuhl invitation, and another lecture in Berlin TU. David Chalmers I met in Dubrovnik, and later he came to my Bled conference, as did Wedgwood. I visited Kathy Wilkes in Oxford, where she arranged my visit to a college where Blackburn was teaching at the time, and I had a discussion with Stroud, who told me that the entrance page of a book tells you all. In San Francisco and Boulder I encountered Audi. In Boulder, among others, I met Huemer and Steup.

Those were some of memories about my widely understood analytic philosophy engagements. But I also had an important and ongoing experience with post-structuralism. So, I was accepted by Julia Kristeva to study with her at Jussieu Paris, but then switched to Vincennes department of psychoanalysis, where I later started my PhD thesis with J.-A. Miller who suggested the topics of the theory of descriptions controversy, which started between Russell's and P.F. Strawson's take on the role of language and semantic meaning. For around a decade I listened to Lacan's lectures. And he repeatedly mentioned directedness at the reality worries: the real is impossible, also in modality Hintikka rendition (whatever writes itself, whatever does not end to write itself, and the stuff) -- I later had some nice words with Hintikka at an occasion of a Firenze congress. So, Lacan was interested in *directedness* topics, through his borromean knot joining the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. By

the way, I later participated in Borromeo Milano villa Verdiglione conferences for more than a decade. It turned out that I finished my PhD that was accepted by Lacan with professor Jerman in Ljubljana. Sense and *reference* were the main starting topics, clearly involving directedness, in the area of philosophical semantics. Definite descriptions controversy put Russell on the side of the closed reference aiming system, and Strawson on the open socially engaged structure. In this way, I used the lacanian approach to engage into the analytical philosophy controversy. I opted for the communication-intention side, which isn't surprising given my influence through such people as Kristeva and Derrida (whose lectures I listened to), cherishing *narration* in many of its forms. So one may say that narration was one of the informing strands of my philosophical engagement.

Narration and its directedness actually was my family heritage. Both my parents were prolific and important Slovene writers. Father Ivan Potrč wrote several novels, many short stories, and also theatrical pieces, besides movie scenarios (and some stories for children). My mother Branka Jurca started with socially engaged prose, but after WWII she began a successful prolific career in literature for children. Both of my parents spent some time in concentration camps and were lucky to survive. My mother wrote a book on her experiences that was published in 1945! Her important engagement was as a teacher in elementary school, a job she enjoyed. Discussions in the family constantly revolved about the Slovene literary scene at that time. So *narrative directedness* in this sense is what I inherited from home. In elementary school, I remember writing an essay whose narration force surprised the teacher. My sister Marjetica became one of the world's most cherished artists, developing her own narrative directedness in this manner. And my half-brother was a successful alpine climber, who also wrote some engaging stories. So, *narrative directedness* is a part of my family heritage. Both of my children pursue a narration bound career.

It is not surprising that I started as a student of comparative literature (besides to philosophy). At that time, Ocvirk was the teacher, while the real, also philosophical influence came from professor Pirjevec, who constructed a theory of novel, figuring the not always successful romanesque hero in his narrative pursuit -- along the Heideggerian history lines summary (in his Nietzsche book, whose part was translated at the time by Ivan Urbancic). So I developed interest in Heidegger, in his being-in-the-world, as it later came into foreground with my Dreyfus interaction. The main idea was actually that an agent, an organism, finds himself in the world, where the entire epoch perspective, through its holistic influence, guides his actions and decisions. That idea later informed my ecological psychology approach that I embraced, according to which an organism is a substantial part of its environment, the world, through which it gets shaped. The environment affords the agent to behave in a certain manner. In this direction I later embraced mereological essentialist take on the understanding of the phenomenon: phenomenon as an accidental whole with the substance as its only proper part. You take away that part, and the phenomenon ceases to exist. This is how I applied Chisholm's view on phenomenon, arguing that it is proper to both Brentano and Heidegger. But as I said an important incentive in this direction was my interest in Gibson's ecological psychology.

Coming to the structure of the phenomenon and to phenomenology, I realized that there is the best Slovene tradition, such as elaborated by Veber, a Meinong's pupil, which deserves some attention. *Intentional directedness* thus became important, and it was understood by Meinong as directedness at an object (Gegenstandstheorie). Veber embraced this kind of directedness, and later turned to his *hitting of reality* (zadevanje) directedness approach. As the whole reality is involved here, one idea may be that it exercises a holistic pressure at the directedness activity itself. This gives some slack to *narrativity* pressures as the basis of *directedness* activity.

Plunging into intentional directedness waters, I became engaged into Brentanian tradition, and spent a couple of years in Wuerzburg Brentano institute, right above the Residenz wine cellar, where professor Baumgartner was my guide. (I also met Josef Roell and published a lot of written and edited stuff with his publishing house, not least *Acta analytica* journal that I established and is now with

Springer). It turned out that the main presentation-thought-desire structure of experience hierarchy is common to the entire Brentanian tradition. I composed a phenomenology and cognitive science TEMPUS project in Wuerzburg, whose proceedings were published by Roell. I am a Wuerzburg University alumni.

In the last decades I had an ongoing interaction with Terry Horgan, who repeatedly came to Slovenia, where we presented our papers at the occasion of Bled international conferences. We earlier proposed an already mentioned ontological monistic approach, with truth as indirect correspondence as its basic constituent. Vagueness was one kind of topic that we engaged in. Among our Bled presentations, the paper proposing *chromatic illumination*, related to morphological content and reasons' effectiveness, experienced some attention. For some years now we embarked on a book project concerning belief formation from phenomenology involving perspective. One early version of the book was practically finished, also with the help of Vojko Strahovnik, with whom I have collaborated for several decennies already, and who also worked with Terry on that project during his Arizona Fulbright stay. In the meantime Terry and myself were occasionally joined by David Henderson, publishing papers on transglobal reliabilism-evidentialism, on our rational disagreement steadfast take, where we proposed a means-to-ends story about belief formation levels, and another one on holistic and abductive belief formation proposals. As I said, Vojko Strahovnik was the first to join my and Terry's epistemic belief formation book project, and lately David Henderson became a part of our zoom sessions. All this had an important impact on my philosophical views. In respect to *narrative directedness*, the topics of *chromatic illumination*, *holism* and *abduction* in belief formation, are of central importance, as I will try to explain in what follows. The topics of intentional *content* and phenomenology were widely discussed in our zoom sessions. And my beloved topics include all-in-ultima facie *epistemic seemings* as the *understanding* appreciating informed entrance level into belief formation, bashing benightedness embracing one-dimensional approaches in this area -- the narrativity and understanding directed approach with the name of Potrč's Principle.

2. Holistic and abductive intentional directedness against atomism and separatism.

The thesis that I defend is that intentional directedness is really narrative, so that the scene of the occurrent content gets chromatically illuminated through the pushes and pulls both through memory traces and future expectations. The holistic pressure aims at the point of directedness which comes through the constant *abductive* hypothesis to the best explanation of the cognizer's involvement. This is opposed to the atomistic and separatist ways of approaching intentional content. The idea is that each content scene moment really obtains its meaning just through chromatic illumination through the entire narrative corpus in which it is positioned. The relevant elements of that holistic corpus exercise their impact at the appropriate logical time. There is no meaning and no sense without this *narrative* environment and its abductive dynamical pressures. This is a new and sensible approach to the intentional content, which may be called that of *narrative directedness*. Meaning only comes to a content from the (timely tracing and anticipatory) pressures of the narrative environment. Chromatic illumination through the morphological content background cognitive reasons is crucial here.

The *narrative directedness* approach embraces *holism* and *abduction*, which is opposed to the customary *atomistic* and *separatism* proposing ways to go in this area.

1. *Narrative directedness.*

1.1. The customary approach to *directedness: atomistic* and *separatist*.

1.1.1. *Atomistic* directedness.

There is a widely embraced presupposition that *directedness* needs *atomism* as its enabling condition. Directedness, so it may be argued, requires a non-vague, promptly accessible and instantaneously effective triggered basis. And a suitable and good candidate for this is something like atomistic representation, whose characteristics is that it is endowed with sharp, non-vague boundaries. So, the “cat” representation is different and independent of the “dog” representation. And once as it is triggered, it decisively points in a certain direction. In the case as the cat representation would be vague, there would be a needed adjustment, which would to some extent obstruct or delay the process of directedness. Atomistic representation is further supported through evidential consciousness, which again enhances directedness, as the word indicates, a *direct* aiming at some point. This all seems to be in support of directedness, but we later criticize the evidential consciousness reflexive support of the atomistic representation as what we call *over the edge* atomistic approach to directedness. One worry for the atomistic directedness approach comes with realization that the appearance of the representation in one’s experience may be not completely certain, but that it is rather vague, which leaves some cognitive adjustment possibility slack that may be practical in several circumstances. The actually existing cats may be slightly different, in respect to their color, behavior, weight and age, and some may be even similar to other creatures. So some vagueness may be welcome in an agent’s directedness assessment. But an atomistic approach will not opt for vagueness but rather for a powerful classic computation inspired tractable mechanism, with the aim to promptly secure directedness. What we call an over the edge evidential conscious support of the atomistic representation will then enhance its directedness promptness.

1.1.2. Separatism

Separatism is the thesis according to which the *intentional content* is separated from, has nothing to do with *phenomenology*, i.e. with the *phenomenal experiential subjective consciousness*. And on the other side it claims that phenomenal experiences have nothing to do with intentional directedness, that they are separated from it. We have stated that an atomistic approach to directedness profits from consciousness. But this was the case of what we called over the edge reflexive self-consciousness which is designed to provide evidential support to the atomistic representation embracing directedness. Separatists usually claim that phenomenology is to be found in *sensory* experiences only, such as pain or pleasure, those that aren’t endowed with directedness at their sensations grained level, which does not allow for reflexive self-conscious evidential support to be applied to it, as it goes for higher order cognition, such as the formerly discussed representation shaped one. Even more, there is then a building block mereological relation claimed to exist between the sensory ingredients and higher cognitive stuff from which they appear to be constructed. Sensations may be phenomenology endowed, according to separatism, all in lacking the intentional force support, which is there with higher cognitive representations, these then coming without the

experiential subjective phenomenology, for it would only impede them in their over the edge reflexive consciousness evidential directedness enabling support.

1.1.3. *From compositional mereology to mereological essentialism.*

Notice that the building block compositional approach embraces what may be called *compositional mereology*: at the lower sensory level there is phenomenology characteristic for each of the sub-atomic sensory items. Now, these items may come together, so that a new whole is built out of them, which is then endowed with qualitatively different properties. Whereas sensory stuff is phenomenological, perhaps phenomenally but not reflexive consciousness accessed (it is below the noticeability level), its composition can result in higher level representation, which is endowed with a quite different *quality*, namely that of reflexive evidentially supported self-consciousness. To this separatism inspired compositional mereology we oppose *mereological essentialism*. The idea here is that the higher level entity as a whole is a *contingent whole*, which may be composed out of several lower level constituents, which however hold together just under the condition that they ex-sist, as we may say, because of the presence of the only *proper part*, the cognitive or epistemic agent's *phenomenological consciousness* presence, i.e. *subjective experiential phenomenal substance* part, which holds the phenomenon together in its ex-sistence. You take away that proper part, and the phenomenon as a whole ceases to exist. That's the *mereological essentialism*: there is this *phenomenal* proper part that is inherent in each ex-sisting phenomenon as a contingent whole. You take away the *phenomenality*, and phenomenon ceases to exist. We may say that this is passage from atomistic and separatist directedness to *narrative* directedness, for mereological essentialism seems to offer a way for sensations to be phenomenal, *subjective experiential consciousness* informed stuff. Phenomenon participates in the narrative directedness as indicated and supported through its essential and only proper part, i.e. through the fact that the epistemic or cognitive agent gets involved into it as a part of the widely encompassed meaning providing story.

1.2. The narrative directedness approach: holism and abduction

Once atomism and separatism are disciplined, a *narrative* environment comes into place. Each narrative story grips one's attention in an all encompassing manner, so that at any time you pursue expectations linked to the narrative background, to variable and appropriate extent. In this sense the entire story selectively exercises its impact upon what catches your attention at this very moment. But just how can all this broad background effectively intervene at what goes on right now? The answer is that there is an *abductive* mechanism involved in the momentary content of the story interpretation: one is out in an ongoing attention effort to form hypotheses to the best explanation of what is encountered in one's experience. This is the basis of one's dynamics involving *directedness*, as the product of several morphological background inhabiting dispositional reasons which are prompted through the ongoing story attention, from several angles in the multidimensional supporting cognitive landscape. The considered contents are not atomistically lonely anymore, and an experiential *phenomenal* support of the cognitive or epistemic agent is needed for *directedness* to succeed.

1.2.1. Holism and narrative directedness

It may be strange to think from the atomistic perspective about how it is possible that the entire story needs to be involved in each particular occasion of directedness. For it seems that non-vague atomistic representations, which are supported by the over the edge reflexive consciousness, are just right to do the job, and that the entire wide story background just cannot support the directedness requirements. One encounters the *frame problem*: just which elements need to be used in order for the directedness at an appropriate *meaning* in the situation can succeed? It turns out however that the frame problem is there exactly for the atomistic and tractable computation requiring directedness preconditions. It may be that what actually happens, in one's directedness efforts, is to surpass the atomistic perspective through the involvement of several background reasons proper to the entire story, which exercises its local impact in a *dynamical* manner, from several angles, to the exactly relevant extent, in order to alert the agent about what has its meaning for him right now. An abundance of perspectives, angles, through which the background reasons exercise their impact upon the occurrent content scene are needed.

1.2.2. Abduction and narrative directedness

One's environment constantly changes, if nothing else through one's attention shifts. One needs to do the right thing at each moment in time, in order not to fall and stumble, to appropriately interact with others, to live properly. So the occurrent content in one's attention scene dynamically changes all the time, and one needs to adjust to it. But just how can this be done? Through the dynamical impact of an abundance, of the surplus of background reasons, which exercise their effect upon the occurrent content scene. This is the *abductive* mechanism: one is constantly engaged into forming *hypotheses to the best explanation* in respect to the dynamically changing content in the occurrent attention scene. And this can only be done if there is a rich background holistic dispositional treasure of several dispositional contents in the multidimensional cognitive background, which are candidates for throwing the appropriate light upon the actual occurrent content scene. In fact, the *holistic* rich background offers abundance of these dispositional contents, which can then function as *reasons* for elucidating the occurrent content scene from several angles, in a dynamically adjusting effort. In fact, at the occasion of each new occurrent content interpretative task, there is *competition* between several of these dispositional reasons, and also when needed their cooperation, so that they appropriately elucidate the scene at hand. The illustration through the several reflectors, of various intensities and colors, which elucidate the theatrical scene, may be appropriate here. These reflectors are not themselves at the scene, but they produce an appropriate aesthetic effect, through their mingled and variable enlightening of the scene. So their *features* are making an impact in the scene, without that these reasons, sources, would themselves be directly represented in the scene. This is the idea of *chromatic illumination* by reasons which we have developed on another occasion. Notice that the color and intensity of illuminating reasons depends upon the system's earlier engagements and upon the holistically supported narrative expectations about what is to come. The paths that were travelled to similar points at the landscape may be broader if taken repeatedly in the past. All this shows that *abduction* is the proper mechanism to secure *directedness* upon a

holistic background basis. There is a *logical time urge to conclude* (as Lacan would say) in order to be *directed* at the right content at the right time, in an appropriate manner.

3. Brentano's intentional directedness

Given that Brentano was the first and most important philosopher to engage in intentional content directedness inquiry, some words have to be dedicated to his trial.

3.1 Intentionality. Brentano's approach: directedness at a content or object, consciousness supported. Brentano's turn to Aristotle in opposition to *wimpy* philosophy.

Intentionality or intentional directedness is the approach that was introduced by Franz Brentano, in opposition to what he treated as wimpy¹ philosophy of his time, such as the one characteristic for German classical philosophical tradition of Hegel and Kant, with its contemporary popularity. As against this, he proposed the return to origins, or as he understood it, to Aristotle's philosophy, such as the teaching about categories.² This would provide a *metaphysical* basis, which however was complemented by the insights of *psychology as an empirical science*³. Brentano was on the peak of his times' development of precisely this, namely psychology as an empirical science, with his work on such topics as the hypothesis of green as phenomenal color⁴, and of what is nowadays known as the Muller-Lyer illusion⁵. Brentano had ambition to pursue his scientific itinerary, but because of the fact that he obtained a teaching position in philosophy, continued in this route. He started with the just mentioned book *Psychology (sic!) as an Empirical Science*, where he defends the thesis of *intentional directedness*, saying that in each thought, something is thought about, and that in each desire, something is desired. So thought or desire are *directed* at some *content* or *object*. What the intentional directedness involved was precisely starting a controversy between the just mentioned content or object interpretations, in the wide

¹ Wimpy means that there is a shabby lack of determinacy, such as it may be found in what may be construed as a kind of hegelian philosophical approach to content, and more recently, in post- kinds of philosophical approaches, such as the one of Derrida, say. Certainly there are interesting contributions and possibly even advantages to some sides of the mentioned approaches. But in respect to an account of content requiring intentional centered directedness these lack some of the generally required properties, such as determinateness which is a characteristic of intentionally directed mental content, as it seems. Again, there is a trap in opposing the earlier mentioned wimpiness in this manner, as we will try to demonstrate, given that it follows an *over-the-edge* attitude. So our approach borrows in a dialectical manner some acceptable lessons from wimpy approaches, all in trying to *discipline* them. This kind of follows Matjaž Potrč's itinerary from the so called continental, across analytical, and finally to the healthy post-analytic dynamics and phenomenology endorsing approach in philosophy.

² Brentano lectured on *Theory of Categories* (Kategorienlehre).

³ Brentano: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.

⁴ The hypothesis that green is not a genuine color, such as are blue and yellow, which however produce the experience of phenomenal green once as they are appropriately distributed over a surface in such a way that they appear in a tiny pointillist size below the threshold of noticeability. So they produce the experiential effect of the phenomenal green.

⁵ In his time, this one was known as the *Brentano illusion*, and had an important effect and feedback in the empirical psychological community.

arrangement of views developing among Brentano's followers. Meinong, for example, defended the intentional object interpretation.⁶ One important ingredient of Brentano's approach to the *intentional directedness* thesis was his reliance upon Cartesian *consciousness*. One may say that the *clear and distinctive* consciousness is the Brentanian support of intentional directedness, providing the bulwark against what he considered to be earlier mentioned wimpy philosophical tradition.⁷ Now, despite the importance of Brentano's thesis concerning intentional directedness in respect to the wimpy tradition that he opposed, there is the trap to go *over the edge* in following non-wimpy requirements. It is questionable whether Brentano would embrace these over the edge consequences, but certainly the overall tradition in pursuit of the intentional directedness thesis, especially in analytic philosophy branches, is often inclined to pursue this. So our main thesis is a healthy moderate rejection of wimpy tradition, by trying to defend *narrative intentional directedness* approach, with its *holistic reasonish normative* support and with its abductively supported *centering*, i.e. intentional *directedness* as the follow-up of the dynamical relevance settling requirements of the cognitive or agentic system, where *phenomenology* plays a central role.

The next question is why it was a good move. The answer is that wimpy has orderly and tractable as its counterparts, and exactly that was offered by intentional content approach: there seems to be a clear centering at a content, without wimpiness, and there seems to be a promise of tractable treatment of such contents. Besides to this, the *directedness* is as well included into intentional directedness, as this goes, as it seems again, with intentionality. A clear evidential conscious supported access to the intentional content seems to be promised as well.

However, all these points may be put into question by the introduction of the *narrative intentional content* alternative. Which one of these is correct? We opt for the latter possibility, trying to show how it takes on board some desirable data from the wimpy approach to content, all in still retaining the appropriate handling of content, and of *directedness* which is characteristic to it.

There are what we call *over the edge* requirements prompted through *atomistic* and *separatist* usual predominant take upon the intentional content. They go well with the opposition to the wimpy account of content, perhaps hegelian or unconsciousness approaches to it. These over the edge requirements try, as just hinted, produce independent well delineated intentional directedness meaning (which by the way goes contrary to our belief that language and thought, in opposition to the world just cannot be non-vague, for in this case they would have nothing to do with normativity, but it will turn out that normativity is a basic constituent of appreciation of the intentional content through various reasons from many angles and sides).

In our *narrative directedness* approach we incorporate phenomenal, chromatic illumination features that illuminate the scene of the occurrent content, and in this way we

⁶ It is interesting that Meinong as well, similarly as Brentano, started with psychology as an empirical science pursuit, and was the first in this sense in the Austrian tradition. Meinong first established an empirical psychology research department, and only later switched to philosophical pursuit of the theory of objects in various branches.

⁷ Franc Veber, a Meinong's pupil, reports his revelatory insight when reading Descartes' consciousness dedicated work.

cherish what may be gripping in the narrative post-structuralist approach to what may be *relevant* in the situation, the pursuit of what I call *beautiful patterns* for some time now.