

I have been preoccupied with various forms of *directedness*, such as intentional directedness and semantic reference or referential act. There is a widely accepted manner in which such matters are treated, namely in an *atomistic* and *separatist* way. As against these, one can propose *narrative* background as not just enabling but as well *requiring* directedness to come about. The narrative background enables *understanding* and so provides *meaning* to the *scene* of the occurrent content. This scene is chromatically illuminated by *reasons* from the background cognitive morphological content landscape. The rush to make the occurrent content scene *relevant* comes from *narrative temporality* dynamics. If you engage into a story, say listening to it, what you just happen to hear or read at this very moment obtains its meaning from the *past* traces as they are forthcoming as features that chromatically illuminate the scene (from the entire story as you understand it, into which you have already plunged), and from the expected *future* ways in which the story may proceed, as you get it. Notice that this does not just go for the fables, but as well for each case of narrative engagement. Yes, there is narrative engagement -- the background story with its landscape and convoluted reasons which are dispositionally stored in it -- that enables words to have *meaning* and reference. If I say “cat”, this does not mean anything to you unless your *understanding* is backed up by a *narrative* story, which provides *hermeneutic* background to the *relevant centering*. You have to grasp the angle and the situation from which I happened to pronounce the word, in order for this word *to mean* anything to you, to deliver you some information. The entire *understanding hermeneutical background* is involved in each occasion of the semantic *centering*. And centering is there for the simple reason that an agent, a cognitive or epistemic agent, or agentive agent as for that matter, needs to make *sense* of what is relevant in always already dynamically changing circumstances in which he finds himself engaged. People and other animals need to be attentive and they need to evaluate what is happening at this very moment: is it important to them, should they engage into action now or in the future, should they give it another thought, or is it of no real action involving importance? Or, are they invited to enjoy the situation, in some of the ways which are there at their disposal? In other words again, the entire holistic narrative story is there in support of this word’s or that behavioral items’ *understanding*, along with a possible reaction or action as prompted by it. Creatures are *attentive* at what is going on in their surroundings; they need to *understand* it and react to it in an appropriate manner. That understanding requires the entire story which stands behind what is currently occurring at the scene. These may be quite complicated stories if one would try to describe them through all the breath and detail, but humans do *get* them in a moment (along with other animals such as your cat or dog, which may connect to the story in a more direct manner as humans do, and engage in some other complexities involving dimensions which are more nuanced for them as for humans, such as the experiential smell involving space). Sometimes people do not realize what is really going on, they do not get it for a while, but as they do, there is this “Aha”-effect, and it becomes clear to them in a moment, namely the point of the entire story comes clearly before their mind in a moment. How is this possible? There are things that people learn from *past* experiences, along with therein based *expectations* of what is to come in the *future*, and what may be an appropriate reaction along the possible branching outcomes. This is the *narrative temporality* involvement in respect to the appropriate reactions which people and other animals have to plan for in order to get and survive well in their physical and social environment. So agency and rationality, namely rational behavior given the circumstances to which the organisms react and adapt, involve the rich and convoluted *narrative temporality*. It is not just the *past* experiences and *future* expectations however, but *narrative temporality* as well involves a *haste to conclude* concerning what is *relevant* in the situation at hand. One needs to *get to the point*, and this without delay, in the *relevant* moment. So, *narrative*

temporality leads to the *concluding moment*, there is the need to get *directed* at the *relevant* point, at the relevant moment in time. The broader discussion that we engage into here has to do with *agency* and the need for its support through *narrative background understanding*. But this also goes for such matters as understanding of words, the *semantic* understanding. As already remarked, one cannot understand the *meaning* of a word such as “cat” that someone pronounces, without grasping the entire *narrative background* framework in which it has happened to occur. The dispute quite a while ago proposed a *communication-intention* perspective: what has one meant to say, to indicate with her pronouncing the word “cat”? Was it meant in a literal, or in a metaphorical manner, say? In order to get this, the real meaning of what has been said, one needs to grasp the entire *narrative background*. And in most of the cases, this happens without any hurdles. So, the grasp of the entire *narrative background* story is needed for one to understand what the real meaning of the word is, and what are one’s options to react to this. The *agentive* dimension is involved in this, along with *narrative temporality*, and its urge to conclude in real time in spite of and because of the possible complexity behind the story. Actually, just to the contrary, the very *complexity* of the narrative background is what enables temporal momentary *directedness* at what comes as relevant before one’s mind. This involves one’s subtle experiential phenomenal evidence as support of the momentary settling into the occurrent content *scene*, clearly with the support of temporal narrativity memory traces and therein based expectations, all in that centered directedness moment. A wide holistic narrative background is thus needed for such things as semantic and other kinds of understandings to come about.

There is an entire philosophical tradition however which goes against the *narrative background* as the structural understanding presupposition of semantic meaning. One historically popular way to take this path is embracing what are called *propositions*. A proposition indicates something such as a *sentence* and its *meaning*, although the linguistic meaning may be exchanged through mental stuff and many more. The basis of such a propositional approach is that one gets something *atomistic* upon one’s plate. Now, the sentence may be “The cat is on the mat”, and one can abbreviate it with the letter *p*. Of course, there are constituent words of this sentence, where each has its separate presupposed atomistic meaning, and they come in arranged combinations, which result in the meaning of *p*. But as said, the main reason for introducing propositions is getting rid of what we call *narrative background* and *understanding* which is enabled upon its basis. Compositionality of constituent terms appearing in a proposition is then required, in a tractable manner, which involves general laws to this effect. Now, our position is that such an *atomistic* approach to *meaning* is wrong, for it eliminates the *narrative background*, with its *narrative temporality* dynamical *directedness* urge to settle the cognitive or agentive system into the *relevant* directedness point, which turns out to be an ongoing process, with its specific *phenomenal experiential* support.

Notice that *propositions* are philosophical atomistic constructs, which seem to have their meaning in a clear *non-vague atomistic* manner. Propositions are supposed to have their *content*, which is independent from their narrative background. As *atomistic* contents, propositions are then supposedly brought together following some kind of tractable rules, so that in this manner they end up to construct a structure, which is surveyable but does not need to be narrative. In fact, there is no *narrative temporality* with its centering requirements involved. Reference and meaning seem to come in an atomistic manner, independent of the *engaging* and *understanding* providing narrative background. Propositional content, besides this, is presented as non-vague, with sharp boundaries. Georges Rey (1983), just to provide an illustration, holds concepts and subsequently their propositional contents, in the manner as we discuss the matters now, independent of any psychological approach with its vague and arbitrary characteristics, and *innate*: the word or the proposition “cat” has its innate meaning independently of any psychological variation quirks that come about in cognitive accessibility conditioned approaches. This introduction of the clearly delimited concepts and propositions, by the way, seems strange and incorrect, if one takes language/thought to be vague as we

do (Horgan and Potrč 2008), but it goes along with the supposition that propositions, whatever they are, are supposed to be a kind of ultimate atomistic *ontological* stuff (whatever that stuff might be; we subscribe to the non-vagueness of the language-thought independently existing world, although again we would object to non-monist pluralist proposition existence presupposition).

Understanding along with *narrative* background is eliminated from *propositions*. This has strange consequences for such matters as epistemic belief *justification*. It tends to be held that epistemic justification of a belief has *propositional* justification as its basis, and that such a basis needs to be then taken in a reasonish manner for there to be *doxastic* justification, i.e. epistemic justification of belief in question. The *evidence* in support of the belief's propositional justification is then gathered as an atomistic matter, coming in a reliabilist or in reflexively foundationalist manner. Both of these moves may be put into question however if one is inspired by *narrative background* justificatory support. In this manner, atomistically leaning reliabilism justification support for a belief may be grasped as *transglobal evidentialism-reliabilism* (Henderson, Horgan and Potrč 2007). Belief related justification foundationalism may be expanded and transformed into a plausible sort of *coherentism* (Henderson and Horgan 2000) This all shows that propositional atomism is a tempting, and yet questionable strategy, as observed from the *narrative background* perspective. Mechanistic knowledge leaning constructions are then proposed in the place of *understanding*, and *directedness* remains a problem. Notice though that the customary passage from proposition to doxastic justification of belief happens once the propositional justification with its evidential support and the stuff, is taken into the space of *reasons*. It should be noted here that *narrative background* environment however is a natural space of reasons involving *narratively agentive* environment, along with its introduction of *normativity*, such as epistemic justification related normativity in the just discussed area.

Now, what does this all have to do with *separatism*? Separatism is the view that there is independence of *intentionality* and *phenomenology*. Phenomenology is taken to be what-it's-like subjective conscious experience. Whereas *intentionality* is *directedness* at the content, which may be taken as the just introduced atomistic propositional content. Brentano as the one who introduced intentionality in the contemporary debate took consciousness and as we understand phenomenology to be a constitutive precondition of intentional directedness. Later on however, phenomenology and intentional content directedness tend to be *separated*. More precisely, phenomenology was portrayed as related to *sensory* phenomena or experiences, such as feeling pain, itch or sensing color. These were taken to be experiences which come without content. On the other hand, *intentional* directedness was supposed to come with the *content*, which we have hinted at in its customary atomistic form. Separatism is thus the view that phenomenal and intentional content involving experiences are of two different registers, so that one of them has nothing to do with the other. There is a possibility of combining sensory and intentional data in a building-block manner, so that one would recognize similarity of individuation mechanisms, which however happen at two basically different, although supporting levels. This is what I articulated as Two Levels Theory concerning sensory and conceptual *categories*, being inspired by this through Meinongian and sensory categorization studies. Atomistic approach to intentional content however did not allow for any kind of mutual support, thus obtaining a desired atomistic directedness without the narrative background. As against this separatist move, the thesis of Phenomenology of Intentionality and Intentionality of Phenomenology (IP&PI thesis) was proposed by Horgan and Tienson (2002) and elaborated for IP angle by Potrč (2002). It is to be noted that *narrative background* support of intentional *directedness* (with its narrative temporality past experiential traces and expectations about what the story may bring) is compatible with IP&PI thesis. Intentional *directedness* has narrative background *holistic* support, which it handles through *abductive* means.

Notice that what-it's-like phenomenology experience of the narrative corpus, the feeling of immersion into it, with memory traces morphological content landscape reasons and narrative expectations reasons both compete and cooperate in narrative directedness sense. As already remarked, there is the urge to conclude, to settle into a relevant incline point upon the narrative landscape. Phenomenology, in this sense, is a precondition of directedness. There is narrative temporality urge to conclude, to settle into the relevant occurrent content *scene point*. This means that the entire holistic *narrative story structure* needs to be grasped in order for the meaning, referential *directedness* to come about. The occurrent content conscious scene is *chromatically illuminated* by the background *narrative* corpus of *reasons*. These reasons however are not appearing in the *scene* of the occurrent conscious content as being explicitly represented. Rather, they, as just said, *chromatically illuminate* the scene, through their competition and cooperation. One may take a moment of theatrical performance as an example to illustrate what is going on here. The actual *scene* at the stage at the occasion of dramatic performance is illuminated by light sources, reflectors, which find themselves outside the scene, and which through their competition and cooperation, in just appropriate manner illuminate the scene, through their combination of strength and color of light which they project upon the scene, in order to get the appropriate aesthetic feeling to the spectators. Notice that the illumination, as just sketched, is a *dynamical process*, which goes on in time, and follows the *narrative story* as it unfolds. The entire narrative corpus is experientially momentarily there at a certain moment, with past traces and future directed expectations. The important thing is that light sources -- reasons -- are not explicitly represented, but that they are (aesthetically) *appreciated*. That's *chromatic illumination*. Reasons from the narrative background enter the occurrent content scene as *features*, and in this manner they are forthcoming upon the stage. The light sources are *not represented* in the scene upon the stage themselves, they are rather *appreciated*, coming in just an appropriate mix so that they can deliver the needed aesthetic, and first of all, as related to the current discussion, *narrative involvement support*.

The usual treatment of meaning, intentionality and reference is *atomistic* and *separatist*, as we just hinted at. *Narrative* approach in opposition to this brings a new perspective through its *holism* and *abduction* involving means. There is no surprise that *holism* opposes atomism. And indeed, cognitive background, in its narrative dynamical temporal forces involving richness, is holistic as they come. Fodor singled out the Quinean and isotropic dimension of holistic systems, such as the background cognitive narrative system in the here discussed case. The Quinean dimension brings the entire holistic system into decision where one should turn his attention. Any specific trait in the system may be important for each of its other ingredients, should they be in the vicinity of its centre or again positioned closer to the periphery. Besides this, there is a kind of systematic handling of the matters which come into consideration along the holistic corpus. The same value remains across the measurement along different directions, as isotropy hints. Narration goes along with *holism*, at the cost for atomism.

Separatism took intentional directedness, say, to come in one *atomistically* molded shape, so that the holistic background and its qualitative phenomenological experiences related to it would stay out of our attention. But once we realize the reality and soundness of holism, of the *narrative holistic* cognitive background, which is needed for there to be *directedness*, such as referential, semantic or intentional directedness, *abduction* may reach its helping hand. Abductive reasoning is neither deductive nor inductive, which both lean in the direction of *tractable* procedures, this last one through statistical means. *Abduction* is namely an instantaneous *formation of the hypothesis to the best explanation* in respect to the encountered situation. And this is precisely what the process of *directedness*, such as intentional or referential directedness, has to accomplish. So abductive process offers a natural way to get directedness, in a momentary manner, onto the *scene* of the occurrent content. This it accomplishes through *chromatic illumination* by temporally attuned *narrative reasons*

such as these, as just said, form a hypothesis to the best explanation, given the encountered dynamically imposed circumstances. Through this *abductive centering*, *phenomenology* gets naturally integrated into the event of *directedness*. In this respect, *abduction* affirms PI&IP thesis, against separatism. Notice that separatism was proposed in support of the atomistic setting, with the promise of obtaining the structure on the basis of tractable rules. Holistic narrative background to the contrary obtains structure through the dynamical momentary centeredness at what is important in the scene. And *abductive centering* does the job here: always already on the hunt for a hypothesis to the best explanation, with the support of qualitative phenomenological chromatically appearing evidence.

A powerful presupposition is that *reasons* need to be *represented* in order for them to produce their effect upon the *scene* of the occurrent content. But if one would be attentive to *consciously represent* reasons, their effect upon the *scene* would be quite different as it customarily happens to be. Reasons would be clearly self-consciously explicitly represented upon the stage of the *scene*. This may of course come about, but it would be rather exceptional. In most cases, reasons from the cognitive background just enter the occurrent content scene as *features* which are consciously phenomenally *appreciated* there without being represented. The effectiveness of reasons comes from their *non-conscious* position: they are not unconscious, for in such a case they would not be really able to exercise their effect upon the scene. Rather, they are non-conscious, which means that they are outside the explicit conscious attention, but that they precisely act as *features* in the conscious content *scene*. In this manner, the background narrative landscape inhabiting dispositional reasons makes them appreciated, producing phenomenal experiential evaluative effect, without being represented.

Chromatic illumination is an important novelty which goes against atomistic and separatist approaches in the area of semantic meaning and epistemic justification of beliefs, say. It reposes upon the *narrative background* based *holism* and *directedness* centering invitation through *abductive* means.

One important matter to be mentioned is the introduction of *morphological content* (Horgan Tienson 1996) as a special kind of content, which has to be recognized besides to the occurrent and dispositional content forms. *Occurrent* content is the one which is consciously explicitly appearing upon the *scene*. *Dispositional* content is the one which is not there upon the occurrent scene but rather dormant awaits its moment of resurrection once as the relevant circumstances invite it to do so. In this manner, dispositional content is something such as the property of solubility, which may be there way before the salt was put into a hot soup filled bowl, but was triggered at the moment as this has occurred. *Morphological content*, as its name indicates, is a kind of dispositional content, with the specific property that it reacts and acts in accordance with sometimes quite complex and convoluted intricacies of the background multidimensional landscape upon which it is positioned. Morphology refers to the *shape* of that landscape. So, morphological content is not atomistically triggered, as this is the case with the usual dispositional content. Rather, morphological content acts in a *direct* manner as it impinges upon the occurrent content *scene*. Its modus operandi is that of Morphologically Operative Morphological Content (MOMC): the *shape* of the multidimensional background cognitive landscape involving morphological content and numerous reasons inhabiting it in various dimensions, involves *appreciative* effectiveness of morphological content in the *scene* of the occurrent content, without that dispositional contents as reasons would be explicitly represented in consciousness as this is the matter with the traditional dispositional content *atomistic* handling. Atomistic dispositionality namely requires the shift from dormant disposition to explicit conscious realization of the content in question. This is not the case for morphological content which, as just said, is *appreciated* in the *scene* of the occurrent content without that it would be consciously *represented* there. The *abductive directedness* support from the *holistic* dynamical background where this happens, is a *relevance* involving phenomenal experience and not an out of the blue matter, as it may be forthcoming in the case of atomistic standard all-or-nothing presence requirements dispositions. The rich background

morphological cognitive landscape pushes towards *relevance* embracing directedness outcome, be it in semantic meaning or in referential or intentional matters. Notice that dismissing of the narrative background exactly makes the content, the *directedness* involving act, to appear as an *out of the blue* kind of experience. This is the consequence of embracing atomism, with its neglect of the cognitive narrative understanding providing background. Semantic or intentional content is supposed to be *represented* at the scene, without any illumination by background narrative temporality involving plurality of reasons, and this eliminates an appropriate kind of phenomenological experience: the out of the blue experience is that of consternation. In such a case, *phenomenology* does not support *intentionality*, intentional content or directedness.

Narrative background as the holistic precondition of understanding, in both semantic and epistemic matters, thus proves to combine with rationally experienced smooth *phenomenology* support that enables intentional or semantic *directedness*, along with its *narrative temporality* engagement to make the actual content *scene relevant* in respect to the interpretative situation. One experiences rational relevant engagement at the appropriate point in time, because there is support through the whole story. Plurality of background reasons provide just the right phenomenal experience to the *scene* into which one happens to be engaged.

Narrative background and directedness are thus not something separated, as the atomistic tractability aiming approach would like to have it. The narrative *structure* is rather *dynamical* and *holistic*, to start with. And this is exactly what not only allows *directedness* at an intentional content to happen, but rather pushes it in this manner, through *narrative temporality* chromatic illumination by plurality of reasons inhabiting the background narrative multidimensional morphological content involving landscape. This is then an *agentive*, rationality respecting engagement.

Our exercise takes *narration* and *directedness* as its point of departure. Which of these would be fitting as the proposed point of departure? *Narration* and narrative background provides *understanding* ability, with its hermeneutic, i.e. narrative temporality engagement. Its holism and agentive, reasons involving engagement acts as the very possibility for *directedness* to be there, in a *rationally experienced*, and not as an out of the blue experienced feature. It turns out that this then involves *phenomenology* as a rationality respecting support of directedness points. Atomism and separatism are undermined, if a sensible account of *directedness*, such as intentional content or semantic referential account directedness, is to be provided.

If one starts with *directedness*, one now realizes that it is an *agentive* and epistemic and semantic *rationality* respecting matter, and that the out of the blue experience of atomistic approach without narrative background understanding support shows the actual need to support directedness by *phenomenal experiential* chromatic illumination by reasons involving support.

It has been asked about the role of consciousness in intentional content directedness accounts. The consciousness which is forthcoming here is qualitative, subjective experiential, and *rational* directedness respecting, as opposed to atomistic and separatist accounts. These look promising to the tractable structure requirements. The actual *directedness* however is possible, contrary to this, on the basis of *dynamical*, *holistic* and *abduction* involving *narrative* background.

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