Experiential Space
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Experiential space has zero point as its origin and it encompasses the whole -- experiential -- world. The experiential world is constituted by rich phenomenal intentionality. The experiential world of myself is shared by my brain in a vat duplicate. It would be wrong to draw from here skeptical conclusion about the external world existence.

Things that I believe
Tackling my views about the experiential space is based upon some things that I believe which are given here, with some preliminary comments:

.(1) There exists a mind independent non-vague world.

Subscribing to the existence of a mind independent world, I oppose nihilism, the belief that nothing exists. I also oppose the view that the world is mind or language dependent, which would equip it with vagueness. So in my opinion the world exists and it is non-vague. There is as well the question whether besides to the world, once I recognize its existence, I also allow for existence of a plurality of things, such as cats and tables. The answer here is conditional, drawing upon the contextual variation in normative metaphysics. Cat, table and this man are ontic and so they ex-sist (in the world: they are vague and they do not display ultimate ontological existence), whereas the world itself is ontological and so it gets accorded an ultimate metaphysical existence.

.(2) Language and thought are vague.

Language and though ex-sist in the world, and they are vague. There is no ultimate border assigned to the predicates such as these are forthcoming in language and thought. Vagueness is transvaluational, opposing thereby the assignment of borders to the involved expressions. Vagueness happily disciplines attempts at wimpy determinations.

.(3) I have a rich Phenomenal Intentionality constituted experiential space, an experiential world.

My experiential space encompasses the whole experiential world, and so it is not restricted to such abstractions of the total experiential states as these are forthcoming with psychological titles of beliefs, desires and plans. It is as well not restricted to bare perceptual experiences. These are rather suffused by conceptual and other kinds of holistic phenomenally constituted intentionality. The bottom line is that being-in-the-world is the real experiential space that I inhabit as a dasein is that entire world. My experiential space is thus not just space-time enriched, but actually it equals the experiential world.

.(4) There is equivalence between my experiential world and between my brain in a vat (BIV) duplicate experiential world.

Supposing that I am a real person, living in a real world, one has to conclude that brain in a vat duplicate of mine shares the same experiential world. The equivalence of our experiential world may be demonstrated by concentrating at the essential, such as this is happening along the methodology of phenomenological bracketing.

.(5) No external world skepticism follows from mine and my BIV experiential duplicate worlds identity.
Despite that the equivalence of my and my BIV duplicate experiential world is affirmed, it does not follow that one has to skeptically conclude to the non-existence of the external world (notice that this would go against my belief (1)). One can merrily affirm the mentioned equivalence and also affirm the existence of the world. The very (misguided) thought that there is some push towards denying such existence may come from the causal underpinnings of real world experiences. But such causal underpinnings do not figure in the essential phenomenologically constituted experiential space.

Clarifying and defending these views of mine I will recur to what I understand to be the experiential space’s specificities. The first of these is that experiential space is really holistic, and that it encompasses a whole experiential world. Experiential space is therefore nothing but an abstraction, concentration at one dimension of such a world. Another of these experiential space’s specificities is the indexical zero point, singling out that this is my experiential space (and not yours, as for that matter).

**Zero point and the experiential world**

Experiential space has zero point as its origin and it encompasses the whole -- experiential -- world.

The experiential space proceeds from myself as the center of conscious awareness, which may be called zero point. Mach illustrates zero point by a depiction of my visual surroundings from the perspective of myself being comfortably seated in a reclining chair. This perspective involves my body and my immediate vicinity, without my face and eyes though, for it is from these that the visual experience is enabled. My eyes see the surrounding, without that I would be able to see my eyes: that’s my visual zero point.

Zero point is keyed to my perspective. The access to my experiential space may be illustrated by the essential indexical. Mach again provides the following story. One morning he embarked the tram and entering it saw a strange looking person with ruffled hair thinking to himself “What a disgrace”. But after a while he realized that actually, he was looking at his own image in the mirror with which fin de siecle Vienna trams were equipped. What happened is that he changed his perspective from observing the scene from an objective point of view to observing the same arrangement from the subjective point of view. Even more, the perspective he engaged in, he switched to in the momentary instance of realization, was that of essential indexical: he realized that the strange figure he was looking at was he himself. Indexicals are expressions such as now, here, which change their referent as keyed to the contextual (temporal or spatial) circumstances in which they are uttered. I, myself is an essential indexical though, for it draws upon the perspective of the very person who is engaged into situation. Perry tells the story of shopping in a supermarket and noticing that someone is leaving a trail of sugar. So he decides to catch the person and alert them. Circling around the stacks then he suddenly realizes that it is he himself who makes the mess. Another illustration of essential indexical is that of you walking through the woods, getting message on your smartphone that a wild bear is endangering hikers. But then you realize that the hiker under threat is you yourself. It is certain that at this moment of realization your behavior will change. Essential indexical is well suited to alert you about the difference between first and third person point of view. In fact, it provides you
the perspective of zero point: you yourself being at the center of what is going on. This is a good entrance into the experiential space. (The whole problem of reference, from Frege, over Kripke, to Russell and beyond merits to be studied from the zero point perspective, see recent philosophy of language commentary book.)

The thing however is that experiential space is not just something that is restricted to your immediate spatial surroundings and its experience. In fact, you are not able to be engaged into experiential space unless you inhabit the entire experiential world. And this is what you do: you are always already in your experiential world, as hermeneutics people would say. You are a dasein with your being-in-the-world always already situatedness. The world coming along with this is your experiential world, whose part is your experiential space. The essential indexical with its zero point perspective is the precondition of your always already inhabiting of the experiential world as your experiential space.

Richness of holistic phenomenological intentionality constituted experiential world

Experiential world is constituted by rich phenomenal intentionality. Notice that your experiential space is far from being one-dimensional. There are several dimensions within it, coming with its constitution. Your experiential space is constituted by phenomenological intentionality, and this is what makes it the whole-featured experiential world.

The thesis of phenomenal intentionality (PI) claims that intentional directedness is constituted through phenomenology. The first step into realizing this comes from defence of phenomenology of intentionality and intentionality of phenomenology thesis: intentional directedness is constituted and enabled through phenomenology, and phenomenal experience is enabled through intentional directedness (intentionality of phenomenology: IP) -- at the experiential space. The pain that I experience is located in my body. This goes against separatism in the PI and IP treatment in analytic philosophy.

But there is more: engaging into experiential space presupposes inhabiting an experiential world. This experiential world is the always already precondition of my intentional engagement. Notice that I could not have my essential indexical switch enabling experience if I would not have holistic phenomenology constituted conceptual instantaneous recognition of a bear being there, as follow-up of my perceptual concepts laden noticing. Phenomenological constitution of my experiential space, in its many holistic dimensions, involves a whole experiential world.

The presupposition that we buy is phenomenology richness, its involvement into several dimensions. This phenomenology richness underpins the richness of experiential space, which always already is the richness of holistic phenomenology constituted experiential world.

Mine and my brain in a vat duplicate experiential world identity

The experiential world of myself is shared by my brain in a vat duplicate. Myself who hopefully and by supposition am not a brain in a vat, do share the experiential world with my brain in a vat counterpart. This is a basic and natural insight that may be supported by the method of phenomenological bracketing. This is bracketing of the supposed empirical and external furniture of the world to what is essential in the experiential world’s constitution. It turns that whatever survives the procedure of bracketing is the essential
phenomenology constituted experiential space, which under its holistic realist angle happens to be one’s experiential world. Given that myself and my BIV duplicate share the same experiential space, i.e. the same experiential world, we come together under this essential dimension angle, supported by our zero point perspective. This gives a thought to curious observation that myself and my BIV counterpart share the same zero point. Which means that my BIV experiential duplicate is my ideal I, in the manner in which it comes through along the phenomenological bracketing procedure. Mine and my BIV counterpart experiential world identity is thereby secured. But some people nevertheless decline to buy it.

Opposing external world skepticism conclusion from my and my brain in a vat experiential world equivalence

It would be wrong to draw from here skeptical conclusion about the external world. There is tendency (see Searle 2015) to conclude that assertion of mine and my BIV counterpart experiential world identity leads to external world skepticism and accordingly to the denial of external world existence.

This is a wrong conclusion. Notice that myself, hopefully and by presupposition not a BIV, have an experiential world. If I perceive a cat in my experiential world, my thought about the cat will be true. Whereas my BIV counterpart’s thought will be false, for he has no real world similar to the one that I am operating in. Identity of our experiential world (based upon sharing of the zero point essential indexical) does not imply identity of our external worlds. It is simple: my BIV, in counterpart to myself, my BIV duplicate has no such external world at all; he just shares with me the experiential world together with the zero point perspective.

It is thus curious why anybody would conclude to the external world skepticism and to the denial of such a world’s existence from mine and my BIV counterpart sharing experiential space, i.e. experiential world. The answer lies in externalist presupposition fuelling such a move. This supposition may be countered by phenomenological bracketing to the essential. But here is how externalist may proceed. According to him, my perceptual experience, and ensuing to this, my experiential space is constituted by causal relations which are in the basis of my, but not of my BIV counterpart engagements. It is true that causal relations support mine, but not my BIV counterpart’s experiences. But it is wrong to say that my experiential world is constituted by causal links, whereas my BIV’s counterpart’s experiential world fails to be so constituted. My experiential world namely is constituted by phenomenology, being an intentionality always already involving experiential world. The equivalence between mine and my BIV counterpart experiential worlds comes to the fore through the phenomenological bracketing procedure which reduces the external, causal element to the essential, namely the experiential world’s phenomenal intentionality (PI) constitution.

This is how the accent put upon phenomenological constitution allows us to assert both mine and my BIV counterpart experiential world equivalence and the existence of the external world.