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Analytic Philosophy and Moral Theory
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Analytic philosophy started with presuppositions of descriptive function of language and of the constitutive phenomenology absence from the referential relation. These presuppositions are in tension with each other. Moral theory in the analytic tradition adopted them both. Trials to accommodate moral theory to the mentioned presuppositions however started to be questioned. Various forms of questioning descriptive function of moral judgment have been put into place. And lately, the need surfaces to incorporate constitutive phenomenology into moral judgment. Objectivity may be achieved by expressivist means.

Some preliminary clarifications.

   Analytic philosophy started as a proposal to analyse language. In this sense, analytic philosophy continues the tradition of *mastering language*, so that it would be purified from ambiguities, stretching from Raymundus Lullus, towards Leibniz and encyclopedists. There were two requirements for a non ambiguous and tractable language, i.e. a language that would provide exact referential directedness thereby securing semantic relation, as well as securing reliable inferential relation: *lingua characteristica* and *calculus ratiocinator*. In his *Begriffsschrift*, Frege proposed an impeccable inferential relation setting, in a *written* language modelled upon that of arithmetics. A conversation following this language succeeds without words, so that the two involved participants, say, would just trace the inferential moves upon a two-dimensional surface of a paper. Encyclopedists tried to produce a catalogue of each possible word, thereby specifying its meaning. Frege distinguished between sense and reference, the first one providing a mode for grasping the meaning, and the second one the referred object itself. But his achievement was ultimately inferential, bringing upon the scene the predicate logic (superseding aristotelian subject-predicate centered logic) that is in use nowadays in several rich dialects.

   Frege furnished the basis but he did not yet establish analytical philosophy. This was accomplished by Russell, in his paper On denoting (1905). The sociological impact of what he claimed there was considerable, given that it remained unchallenged for almost half a century, and in fact stayed in value for analytic philosophy as we know it. So we should take a look at what the paper was about. Its departure was stating that language may be misleading, in respect to what it refers to. Many times, it is as if the referring relation would be attempted, but in fact this turns out not to be the case. Take the sentence

   (S) The actual king of France is bald.

In order to see what (S) involves Russell proposes the following analysis:

   (Sa) (ai) There exists an actual king of France & (aii) There is exactly one king of France & (aiii) The king of France comes with the property of baldness.

(Sa) is the proposed *analysis* of (S), where (ai) reveals that it asserts the existence of the actual king of France in the world, (aii) indicates that there is just one such entity thereby accounting for the definite article "the", and (aiii) ascribes the property to the entity in question.

This logical analysis of the sentence (S) thus reveals its deep down logical structure and commitments that is obscured by the surface structure and its commitments. Surface structure implies that there is an entity, the actual king of France. Logical structure makes this implication explicit. As analysis reveals this presupposition (ai), the proposed move is to *check up in the world whether there is such an entity indeed*. Notice that analysis would not reach its verificatory aim without this empirical search for the entity implied by (S) in the world. Semantical relation is thus supported by the search for the referential object in the world. Given that the check-up about the referential weight of (ai) leaves us wanting, the truth value of (S) turns out to be Falsity, considering as well conjunctive nature of (Sa), where all conjuncts need to be true in order that the composite is true as well.

An interesting angle of this analysis is that it switches from the inferential to the semantic, ontologically supported ingredient as its main venue. In fact there are two presuppositions of this analysis, at which we will take a look in the next section. It turns out that these presuppositions are shared by analytic philosophy.

Two presuppositions of analytic philosophy.
Here are the two presuppositions of the analysis of (S), i.e. of (Sa):

> (1). The function of language is descriptive.
> (2). Reference succeeds without constitutive phenomenology.

Presupposition (1) gets repeatedly thematized by analytic philosophy. This is why, by the way, Russell's approach is known as the *theory of descriptions.* The idea is that language is there to describe -- what? Reality. Russell embraced this descriptive function of language through his proposed check-up in the world. In fact, he meant that such a check-up needs to succeed through the exclusion of language. He uses *logical proper name*. Proper name (such as Bertrand, Matjaz, the actual king of France) comes with the connotative baggage and therefore is susceptible to ambiguity. Getting rid of proper name, one arrives to the direct relation with the entity in the world. This *logical* proper name is *demonstrative,* i.e. "this" or "that". It introduces *direct involvement of the subject verifying matters in the world, from the zero point*. This brings us to the presupposition (2), which was *not* thematized in analytic philosophy, although it was non-consciously followed in its practices to tackle the referential relation. Demonstratives and indexicals are in action there, indicating that one has to do with the phenomenology constituted zero point in the attempts to zoom in onto the referent. But as just said, this zero point of referential relation was not thematized in analytic philosophy, although it was practically followed. Now, the symptomatic embracing of the zero point in various attempts to catch referential relation by analytic philosophy indicate that referential relation is really a subspecies of the *generic* relation of *directedness*, which, as *intentional* directedness, is phenomenology-consciousness constituted. This becomes clear once as one considers that by his (ai) and its ontological checkup Russell really rebelled against his former Meinongian view of

the appropriateness of possible objects. With his analysis, Russell switched to actualism, followed in this move by Quine, David Lewis (pluralistic actualism) and many more. He thematized rejection of possible objects. But he did not thematize (and neither did others following him) that referential relation is just possible through *phenomenological-consciousness constitution*. That's the task of spelling out the presupposition (2). One needs to realize that referential relation is a subspecies of generic intentional or directedness relation which is consciously constituted. This was so obvious in Brentanian tradition of which Meinong was a part that it was not even thematized either, now from the perspective of acceptance.

Tension between presuppositions?
Let us take a look at the analytic philosophy presuppositions, starting with the theory of descriptions:

     (1). The function of language is descriptive.
     (2). Reference succeeds without constitutive phenomenology.

Are they in tension, or do they support each other? The answer depends upon referential or generic take on things, where reference turns out to be either externalist or again internalist and evidentialist in its nature.

According to the referential view of things, (2) supports (1). If function of language is descriptive (1), then one may say that reference succeeds without constitutive phenomenology-consciousness. This then leads to the externalist and reliabilist view of the referential relation. And indeed, this was the main manner to approach it in the analytical tradition, from Russell to Kripke and Putnam.

If however one sees reference as a subspecies of the *intentional directedness* relation, then first of all the function of language will not be necessarily descriptive, but rather the one of letting know things in conversation, of thinking and judging activity. But if one nevertheless adopts (1), under this *generic* view of referential relation as a subspecies of intentional directedness, it will need *constitutive phenomenology-consciousness* to get off the ground. This was the *practical* embracing of referential relation in analytic philosophy through the zero point perspective involving demonstratives, indexicals and causal or historical chains, say, that lead to the original phenomenology constituted zero point situation as the verified origin of the referential relation.

By zero point we mean subjective phenomenology constituted angle that allows for re-presentation without being represented itself. Mach illustrated this by depicting what he sees while being comfortably seated in his reclining chair. There is his surrounding room, objects in it and he sees his legs and the rest of his body, without seeing his own eyes as the departure point of his vision. That's the zero point. Now notice that a demonstrative setting involves such a zero point. If I say "that" all in pointing out an item in the situation that I'm involved in, this succeeds from my observation angle, and it cannot be there without constitutive phenomenology, without myself being consciously engaged in this activity. Similarly it goes for the essential indexical that nicely illustrates the switch from the objectivist to the first person point of view engaged perspective. Perry tells the story about trying to alert the person who

leaves sugar trail, while he was shopping in the supermarket. Performing a complete turn around a stack of shelves, however, the he suddenly realized that the person he is looking for is *he himself*, and that the sugar is slowly dripping from his pierced sugar-bag. Zero point awareness is that he got aware in that moment about his own engagement into the venue.

Adoption of analytic philosophy presuppositions in moral theory.
We will take a panoramic look at the moral theory in analytic tradition, asking ourselves whether in followed its generic presuppositions:

> (1). The function of language is descriptive.
> (2). Reference succeeds without constitutive phenomenology.

It is not difficult to see that the presupposition (1) about the descriptive function of language was followed in moral theory and metaethics. One main approach in moral theory is namely *cognitivism*. It is the view that moral judgment is belief-like. But the function of belief is to describe reality. Going realist in this manner brings one to assert the existence of such reality, such as objective goodness or badness. Various forms of cognitivism are opposed by abundance of *noncognitivist* approaches. These take moral judgment to be the product of emotional or other kinds of non-cognitive attitudes. In this manner noncognitivism seems to undermine the presupposition (1). But notice that noncognitivism is articulated in opposition to cognitivism, so the presupposition (1) is well entrenched into the debate. Non-cognitivism is thus non-belief characterizing of moral judgments, and presuming that beliefs are descriptive, non-cognitivism withdraws the descriptive assumption.

Cognitivist search for reality that moral judgments supposedly describe matches well the presupposition (2), according to which the referential function succeeds without constitutive phenomenology. Now, although presupposition (2) well supports the presupposition (1), it seems to be alien to the very nature of the matter in the discussed area that is supposed to be descriptive: the *moral judgment*. Notice that the nature of *judgment* is *evaluative*, involving one's *sensibility* in respect to the *encountered situation*, into which one is engaged from the zero point perspective. Each moral judgment is thus not objectively descriptive, but comes along with *one's engagement*, and this engagement is phenomenologically constituted. A *judgment* comes with *phenomenological quality*, or it isn't there at all.

In respect to what we just stated, it turns out that the presumed referential relation involved into moral judgment should at least be taken in a *generic* sense in order to make any sense at all. From the generic point of view, referential relation is a subspecies of the relation of *directedness*. And the relation of directedness is *intentional* relation, the one that is *phenomenologically constituted*, supported by the *engaged conscious involvement from the first person point of view perspective*. That's the *zero point situational engagement* -- which is in the basis of moral judgment. But if such is the case then both presuppositions (1) and (2) that were adopted by moral theory in analytic tradition have to be challenged. And this is indeed what happened and what is going on in moral theory and in metaethics. In the following two sections we will take a panoramic look at the challenges to the presupposition of moral theory, first

challenges to the descriptive function of language (1), and then challenges to the presumed absence of the constitutive phenomenology in moral judgments' referential relation (2).

Questioning of descriptive function of language in moral theory.
There is an abundance of ways in which the presupposition (1), that the function of language is descriptive, and thereby that moral judgments describe some reality, has been challenged. In the following we just single out some main representatives, which of course has to be refined in a more minutious and careful approach in the future.

Let us start with the error theory, which directly challenges the descriptive function presupposition (1). Error theory namely asserts that *moral judgments do refer to some reality* (this of course supports presupposition (1)), but that they all are *in error.* In other words, the descriptive cognitive function of moral language, of moral judgments, is *erroneous*. And this now undermines presupposition (1).

Take *fictionalism*. It does assert that moral judgments are *descriptive*, thereby endorsing the presupposition (1) of the descriptive function of language and of moral judgment. But these descriptions are *not serious* in the objectivist sense. They behave like fictional descriptions. If one describes Little Red Riding Hood story, one cannot go in any arbitrary direction. She took ham and wine in the basket through the woods walking towards her grandma's house, and did not ride a Harley-Davidson all in wearing a dark helmet instead of the red cap. Despite the required consistency and factual assessment of the story though, the fictional narrative is *not to be taken seriously in the realist descriptivist sense*. So the presupposition (1) fails. And fictionalism asserts that this is the case for moral judgments.

As the last example of undermining presupposition (1) we take a panoramic look at *cognitivist expressivism* or *nondescriptive cognitivism*. As its name says, it at first looks as if it would embrace descriptive function and thereby presupposition (1), for that view is committed to *cognitivism*. Which means that moral judgments are beliefs or belief-like. But here comes the challenge. All in that these moral judgments are cognitive, they do *not describe*, their function is not that. And this is a clear challenge to the presupposition (1) now that gets ultimately trumped.

In this manner, we have indicated that the presupposition of descriptive function of language (1) and of moral judgment was repeatedly put into question and denied in moral theory and in contemporary metaethics. What about the presupposition (2)?

Questioning of the absence of constitutive phenomenology from referential relation, i.e. from judgment, in moral theory.
As already remarked, the way that moral theory and metaethics sticked to the presupposition (2), that the referential function succeeds without constitutive phenomenology, is kind of mind boggling, especially if we take into account -- as we should -- that moral theory deals with moral *judgment*. Judgment as such namely involves *one's direct involvement from the zero point and thus constitutive phenomenology, consciousness,* and one's *sensibility* in respect to the encountered *situation*.

Sticking to the presupposition (2) in moral theory, that referring function succeeds without consciousness or phenomenology was *not thematized* in moral theory tradition at all, in opposition to the presupposition (2) that was repeatedly thematized.

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It is true that one started to involve *phenomenological arguments* (such as the argument that one's phenomenological experience of moral objectivity leads to realism), but these moves did not really put into question the presupposition (2).

The project of *illuminating reasons* now seems to face the challenge of undermining the presupposition (2). First, it is a baffling fact that *phenomenology of moral experience* was not systematically treated since Maurice Mandelbaum's book in 1955.

The illuminating reasons project concentrates at moral *reasons*, whose presence in moral judgment is often disputed, by such approaches as social intuitionism. It provides evidence of *phenomenological* support for such reasons in a constitutive, although *indirectly* forthcoming manner. One simple thought in tradition (following (1) and (2)) was that reasons are explicitly present before one's mind, represented, or they aren't in the picture at all. So reasons have to be directly present. But phenomenological testimony shows that they are *indirectly* present through *qualitative phenomenology*, and from the *first person phenomenologically constituted zero point perspective*. This enables a new take at such phenomena as supererogation, where its paradox (no supererogation if reasons are requiring) is put into question by *enabling* function of reasons. This makes reasons clearly phenomenology supported and fitting to the *everyday* and not just heroes and saints situations, in the supererogation case. Behind all this, the *constitutive phenomenology* as basis for moral judgment asserts its power and its experiential realism.

What about phenomenological support for realism? The realism in question may well turn out to be experiential, and not ultimate ontology committed. Or at least one stays neutral in respect to this question.