What exists?
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What exists? If we take a look around us, we realize that several things exists: cats, tables, cars, trees, even desires and beliefs, moods. Some of these, we are inclined to say, have material or physical existence, and others have different kind of existence, perhaps one that is dependent upon the material or physical. Whereas a cat or a tree exist in a material physical manner, this perhaps cannot be claimed for belief. But beliefs existence depends upon someone holding it, and so there is material basis for it. The belief’s existence is then *supervenient* upon its physical basis, which means that two exactly similar physical or material bases will produce exactly similar supervenient properties or entities, beliefs say (this gets cashed in by counterfactual conditional, whereas supervenience may be local /in this world/, global /holding all over possible worlds/ and even transglobal /holding as well under narrow evidential conditions/). So far for a quick glance at material entities or these that depend on them and are correlated with them in their existence. Some would claim that there exist ideal entities, such as ideas (of Platonic kind, say), which do not depend upon the material or physical basis.

Criteria of existence
There are several proposed *criteria* for determining what exists. There are views that the existence of some things is *prioritary* in respect to the existence of others. So one may think that Being (whatever it happens to be) has a prioritary existence in respect to the matters that one finds in the world. In this view then, Being is *ontological*, whereas cat, tree and car are *ontic*. Notice that in this manner, the objects that we encounter on the everyday basis have a secondary existence in respect to the oomph kind of existence such as it is accorded to Being. There is an *ontological difference* here, people such as Heidegger would say. Other people, such as Quine, said that they are really consternated with such a talk, and so proposed as a criterion of existence the following: “To be is to be a value of a bound variable.” What the hack is this? A variable is marked by letters such as $x$, $y$, $z$. As written here, these are unbound. They become bound though as they are positioned under the range of a quantifier, the existential or the universal one. So the expression $Ex (Cx)$ claims that there exists (E) an $x$, such that the $x$ in question is a cat (C). As a variable is bound, it indicates the existence. “All philosophers are smart” comes in the form $Ax (Px \rightarrow Sx)$, which means that for anything (A) that is an $x$, if that $x$ is a philosopher (P), then the $x$ in question is smart (S). Notice though that this universal quantifier does not accord the existence yet. It just claims that *if* anything is a philosopher, it will be smart. But it does not yet claim that there exist a smart philosopher. Notice that the criterion “to be is to be a value of a bound variable” is best suited for everyday objects, if we are concerned with existence. In this sense, the criterion follows common *sense*, for which as well, the existence is primarily recognized for everyday objects. In this respect, this criterion is against the prioritizing approach that we recognized to be there with ontology, Being and ontological difference.

Individuation
The question of individuation is not equivalent to the question of existence. Suppose that we agree how a cat exists. But we may yet require criterion of individuation for it. We may agree, say, that cat is a physical entity. But we may still say that space is criterion of individuation. If this is the case, then the following comes as a consequence. If the cat moves from spatial position 1 to spatial position 101, and the space is criterion of individuation for that entity, then we actually have 101 cats, for what we consider to be a unique cat actually changed 101 spatial locations. So there are 101 cats, according to space as its criterion of individuation. Actually, we may consider this space to be experiential space, as this was proposed by Brentano. Where we common sensically started with the idea of one unique cat, we ended up with 101 cats. That’s how philosophical attention to criteria enriches matters.

Towards unique identity
Individuation may follow different criteria. Summarizing our previous thoughts, one criterion of individuation would be material or physical substance underlying an entity or whatever is supposed to exist, such as properties, say. In the case of supervenience, the criterion for existence is a subvenient material/physical basis. One may put the question whether in order to pin down the basis of individuation, one may reduce the supervenient entity or property to the subvenient basis (one would thus reduce a belief to its physical support). Again, individuation may be either general-generic or again particular. In the first case, one looks for a general pattern or law (say, counterfactually supported) that underlies individuation (instantiation would be a case in point). In the second case, one would have what may be called unique identity of the supposed entity (there would be unique identity of the intentional occurrence). This would be in power for conscious occurrences of thoughts, say, now not considered as instances of generic patterns, but as forthcoming with individual quality. In this last case, individuation would provide criterion of existence. In fact, conscious occurrence would be criterion of existence, which would go well along a narrow, experiential space involving setting.

Challenges to simple common sense
Let us return to common sense criteria of existence. As we already claimed, common sense recognizes the existence of many different entities, such as cats, trees, boulders and cars. But common sense may go through different stages, as it reflects upon its own conditions. Let us call the first stage of common sense in its dialectics thetic. That’s common sense before it engages into reflective mode. But once it starts to reflect its preconditions, it becomes reflective. Then it finds itself in the antithetic phase. But just why would common sense come to this point at all, perhaps preferring non-reflective easyness? The answer lays in challenges to common sense presuppositions. There are several of these: special composition question, vagueness, and the existence of lightweight posits. Special composition question (SCQ) was proposed by Peter van Inwagen: under what conditions do parts compose another entity? He thinks that SCQ requires as an answer a general criterion, so that we would not end up in position of staying with bunch of disconnected and unexplainable primitives. (Notice that this criterion requirement is similar to the ones which we have already briefly discussed in respect to existence.) He further thinks that what exists are particles, such as recognized by our best science, say atoms, quarks or muons. He then argues that these atoms do not really compose
entities where common sense usually recognizes them, in cases such as these of tables, cars and boulders. The reason is exactly that there is no criterion in their support. He then considers some criteria of composition, such as contact. But he rejects them as not viable, for contact would have counter-intuitive consequence that a new entity would come into existence as we shake hands, a new entity that would go out of existence once as we stop shaking hands. He then concludes that life is an appropriate criterion for composition of particles. There is necessity of composition for atoms that enter cats, in opposition to particles that enter into constitution of chairs. But this means that living beings, such as cats and trees exist, whereas cars and boulders don’t exist. Such a reasoning provides a criterion of existence. But we cannot really support it, for why would cats exist in the ultimate ontological sense? They are namely vague. Vagueness is the next challenge for non-reflexive common sense in respect to its suppositions about existence. We can namely ask ourselves whether cats are non-vague or again whether they are vague. Now consider that a cat drinks milk, and that it is quite impossible to tell which milk-atoms are exactly constituents of the cat along the milk digesting process. Similarly it goes for the air that the cat breathes and that enters into its lungs and into its living system. It is as well a vague matter when the cat comes into existence when it is conceived in her mother’s womb. There is no exact border there that would determine the amount of cells that is sufficient for the recognition of existence. Notice that vagueness is characterized by boundarylessness as a characteristics of sorites sequence with its two constitutive criteria: identical truth value for neighbouring items in the sorites sequence, and different truth values for the items at the opposed ends of the sequence. There is namely the requirement that each neighbour in the sequence has the same truth value. If a man with one hair on his scalp is bald, then the man with two hairs will be bald as well. But man with one hair is bald indeed, whereas the man with 10,000 appropriately positioned hairs upon his scalp is not bald. Both mentioned criteria or requirements for vagueness are in power, and so vagueness turns out to be a matter of weak incoherence. Both of requirements are satisfied, without that there would appear malign strong incoherence such as p&-p. That’s the characteristics of vagueness. Now, given that trees, cats, cars and boulders are vague (it is not possible to determine for each of these which atoms exactly are needed to form them – the car still seems to be the same entity if it is slightly scratched, or even if some part of it is exchanged), vagueness seems to be another powerful reason to become doubtful in respect to the non-reflective positing of objects or entities by common sense. Notice that weak incoherence of vagueness may be welcome for language and thought, whereas the two criteria that are constitutive for vagueness cannot be directly satisfied in the world. A third reason that puts into question the non-reflective recognition of entities that exist in the world comes from lightweight posits. What exactly are constituents of the university? Does it include buildings, people, tables? Obviously the answer is not easy to deliver. The same goes for symphonies: is Beethoven’s 5th symphony composed of four movements? What are the identity criteria for a symphony? Does it consist in a performance, in all performances, in what Beethoven had in mind, in written musical score? The criterion for symphony existence will not ultimately come from all of this. The discussed cases of special composition question, vagueness, and the existence of lightweight posits all point into direction that the beginning non-reflexive recognition of several objects existence needs to be questioned. That’s then the antithetic reflexive phase of common sense
dialectics. What follows is the synthetic phase of common sense dialectics, where common sense itself recognizes that really, the plurality of posits admitted at its thetic phase really do not exist, and that what exists is actually the world without parts or the blobject as we call it, a dynamical and monistic entity. We distinguish snojbjects (plurality of non vague objects), slobjects (plurality of vague objects), and the blobject (non-vague dynamical monistic entity). We claim that just blobject exist, and that this is recognized by common sense at its synthetic reflexive stage of development.

The problem of the many
One way to deal with the existence of cats comes from recognizing many possible arrangements for a cat as so many non-vague cat-compositions. In such a case we would then have 1001 non-vague cats where non-reflective common sense at its thetic stage recognizes just one cat. But this seems counterintuitive, and the problem of vagueness does not go away. Each atom that is a considered possible constituent of the cat namely provides a new non-vague composition for the cat-candidate. But just under what criterion could these non-vague cats be recognized as one existing entity?

Semantics and ontology impossible relation
What is truth as indirect correspondence and why is it needed for austere realism to be a viable position? Before tackling this question, some generic remarks about the relation between semantics and ontology, being attentive at the manner in which these were treated, seem to be in place. Let us start with what we already realized. Semantics (truth) and ontology (austere realism in our case) are related through impossibilities. First, there is impossibility to pinpoint the posits that simple common sense ontology introduces and deals with. We became aware that simple common sense encounters this impossibility through difficulties to ascertain its posits because of special composition question, vagueness, and the existence of lightweight posits; at least it is these we dealt with, although there may well be others. All of the reviewed points related us to an impossibility to deliver ultimate posits of simple common sense. This we think is an instance of more generic impossibility that goes together with the relation between semantics and ontology. In this respect we would first like to point out that the problem of reference demonstrates this, if we attentively review it. The first lesson is that the problem of meaning or reference singles out the relation between language and world. We have found out though that the search for such a kind of direct world-world relation reveals how it actually depends upon the one trying to ascertain this relation from the first person point of view, through demonstratives and indexicals. This experiential space basis of the word-world relation though was customary neglected and dismissed in profit of the third person point of view objectivist take. So the analysis of semantic ingredients of sentences, such as proposed by Russell (On Denoting, 1905), tried to establish a direct word-world relation and found out that this one may be achieved only through reducing the linguistic ingredient to the demonstrative. The ensuing problem of reference treatment (Kripke, Putnam, Donnellan) singled out the indexical ingredient in the trial to get a direct word-world relation (notice that causal and historical chain theories search for the original indexical relation constituting point). Indexicals display phenomenological quality and engagement of the one trying to establish direct word-world relation. Pragmatism
inspired communication-intention semantic trials (P.F. Strawson, Grice) on the other hand put
the world in a decisively second plan, contributing to the holistic phenomenology involvement
into the referential act (perhaps world-word relation, through the acting in the world perspective).
Both of these trends in dealing with word-world relation introduced phenomenology
(demonstrative and indexical ways through the phenomenology of the zero point involvement;
communication-intention trials into the holistic phenomenology as supporting the act of
referential relation so that it could come about). This phenomenology involvement into trials to
ascertain word-world relation was not recognized though, because of powerful presupposition of
this entire enterprise that the relation in question needs to be treated objectively, from the third
person point of view. This was the way in which analytic philosophy was grounded (through
Russell’s theory of descriptions). Recently, the trend towards phenomenal intentionality as
constitutive approach (Horgan-Tienson, Siewert, Galen Strawson) is increasingly recognized.
But it was not really applied to the word-world relation as supporting the problem of reference
 treatment. This is what we propose here: referential relation as basic for word-world ascertaining
is actually phenomenology constituted, from the zero point perspective (another
phenomenological ingredient in the setting).

Once as this is recognized (Potrc: Referential zero point 2015), we are ready to expand
the word-world indexical zero point inquiry towards the theory of truth as correspondence.
Notice that correspondence is a word-world relation. Realize that this relation is zero point
phenomenology constituted, as we noticed above. Austere realism comes as a natural
extension of the zero point phenomenology take on the word-world relation. Semantics and
ontology come together, encountering an impossibility, and thereby promoting constitutive
phenomenology once as this is realized. Notice that this goes on in the zero point
phenomenology constituted environment. All this needs to be elaborated, making the
phenomenological constitution as it comes about in the word-world relation salient. In fact, we
deal with relation between meaning and reference. Frege was puzzled here with his proposal of
senses as multiplicity of descriptions providing tools and with his trials to get to the unique
referent in the world as an ontological anchor. Russell introduced logical proper name in an
acquaintance epistemic relation (recognized by us as a zero point phenomenology constitutive)
dismissing the descriptive power of language, as he tried to master word-world relation. But we
need to come back to our question about truth as correspondence, from this generic important
realization of impossibility characterizing semantic and ontology. One can say that there is no
such relation, or that this relation is impossible. But the dialectics allows us to realize that
relation here is possible through the quality, promoting phenomenology.

Truth as correspondence
In the following we will first take a look at truth as correspondence, then at truth as indirect
correspondence and finally at truth as indirect correspondence in its support for austere realism.
We will try to deliver a simple and naturally ensuing flow of these topics.

Truth as correspondence is a natural approach for taking care of word-world relation. If
something is said or thought, then it is true if it corresponds to the world. If something is thought
and asserted but there is no correspondence to it in the world, then it is not true but false. Notice
that correspondence relation as a generic matter is not committed to whether there are entities
in the world that correspond to constituents of language/thought ingredients. This is seemingly put into question by the Tarski schema for truth:

(T) ‘p’ is true iff p.

An instance of ‘p’ may be the sentence or thought to the effect that ‘The cat is on the mat’, which happens to be true if the world is such that it supports this sentence/thought. Notice that there is no additional commitment in the schema here that there should be entities around which support the correspondence. It is sufficient that the world is such that ‘p’ corresponds to it in order for ‘p’ to be true. This is compatible with correspondence for ‘p’ being supported by the world which does not consist of any atomistic parts but is monistic and richly dynamical. It may still be such that it supports ‘p’ in a correspondence manner. This would then be entrance into conceiving truth as indirect correspondence, about which more in the next subsection.

The seemingly more appropriate and usually embraced interpretation of schema (T) is that of truth as direct correspondence. This one claims that in order for there to be correspondence between ‘p’ and p, one needs to be careful about the compositionality criterion. The thought is that there are names and relations asserted or thought about in ‘p’, which need to be mirrored by entities, predicates and relations in the worldly situation p, so that there would result truth as correspondence. Notice though that at least one influential approach, that of situations and attitudes (Perry) pointed into direction of indexical and ultimately phenomenological underpinning of the correspondence relation, being inspired by ecological immediate and not third person point of view involving objectivist look at the correspondence relation. Let us go back to truth as direct correspondence now. The directness here aims at there being direct relations between linguistic/thought constituents and between entities and properties in the world. We have hinted though that such a relation encounters several brands of impossibility.

Truth as relation of direct correspondence between linguistic/thought sequences and between the supposed entities and properties in the world is compositionality inspired, and through it is tractability, i.e. surveilable procedure inspired, presupposing absence of vagueness in the correspondence relation at hand. So we may say that ‘p’ will be true just in case as there are expressions for names and predicates (n1, ..., nn; pre1, ... pren) composing it, which correspond to entities and properties (e1, ..., en; pro1, ..., pron) in the situation p in the world. Bold print indicates that we have to do with the ultimate ontological entities in the world, according to the construal of truth as direct correspondence. This is a presupposition absent from the construal of truth as indirect correspondence, although that one takes the world to ultimately exist. But in overall, truth as correspondence is a generic approach that is not decided yet between the option of either direct or indirect correspondence construals.

Truth as indirect correspondence
Given that we have found out how the supposition of simple common sense realism about the existence of plurality of entities in the world gets questioned at its reflective stade, following the hurdles for the simple position as they appear in cases featuring special composition question, vagueness and ontologically lightweight posits, we conclude to the possibility of truth as a
relation of indirect correspondence to the world. Notice that this one does not presuppose the existence of ontic entities, and that it nevertheless makes correspondence relation viable. The world is then such that ‘p’ is true. The truthmaker for ‘p’ is then the world in its entirety. Realize that following the hurdles for direct common sense realism, the position that there is a plurality of entities in the world, one is invited to conclude that there is just rich dynamical world, which locally behaves in a ‘p’ manner (without that there would be entities or properties supporting the correspondence with ‘p’ in a tractable compositionality promoting manner). Truth of ‘p’ is thus not directly supported by entities and properties corresponding to its atomistic parts of expression constituents, but by the how the world is in its holistic dynamical entirety. This is then truth as indirect correspondence which accounts for troubles for simple common sense realism encountering hurdles of special composition question, vagueness and ontologically lightweight posits. All of these point to the troubles for simple common sense realism in presupposing the existence of entities. Now truth as indirect correspondence allows for a direct relation to the world as truth-maker and thereby for indirect relation to the supposed entities and properties.

Truth as indirect correspondence supporting austere realism
What we just affirmed supports austere realism, the ontological view that there aren’t a lot of entities besides to the world. There is just one dynamical monistic world. The austerity here is nominalist manner of talking things, dismissing the plurality of entities if these are not necessary. Notice that this stage is still embraced by common sense, following its experience of first embracing simple realism and thus plurality of entities, then switching from this thetic stage to the antithetic reflexive stage encountering the hurdles for thetic position, and finally embracing the austere conclusion of existence of just one world without parts at its synthetic common sense dialectical stage. One can say that truth as indirect correspondence now supports austere realism.

Zero point phenomenology involvement into correspondence relation
An important point that we have mentioned is that correspondence relation involving truth reposes upon a direct first person perspective phenomenological engagement. At least this is the lesson that one learns from trials on philosophy to reach genuine ultimate correspondence relation. Notice that this correspondence relation is usually stated as involving language/thought composition on the one hand, such as ‘p’ (constituted of n1, ..., nn; pre1, ... pren), and the supposed worldly compositional situation p (constituted of e1, ..., en; pro1, ..., pron) on the other side. Trying to pinpoint the referential relation in it basis, philosophers indulged into demonstrative and indexical circumstances, which are clearly phenomenology and zero point based, i.e. involving the first person perspective and engagement. As already mentioned, the situations and attitudes (Perry) approach went into this direction, although its constitutive phenomenology underlying indexicals and holistic world should be recognized. This is what we propose. Zero point is a phenomenology supported first person perspective, through which the referential touch with the world needs to be acknowledged. From this angle, we reached the essential, bracketing mode involving narrow approach to the referential and thereby
correspondence relation. This urges us to doubt externalist and to embrace transglobal evidentialist support for the semantic hook-up with the world.

Zero point phenomenology and the ontology-semantics impossibility
Austere realism (Horgan-Potrc 2008) supports realist austere ontology through semantic contextualism, more precisely through an account of truth as indirect correspondence. One outcome is that indirect correspondence acknowledges the existence of the world, dynamical and rich, monistic. The ontology-semantic encounter is one of impossibility. And it comes through phenomenology, holistic phenomenal intentionality, and through the zero point phenomenology.

The idea is that the austere realism project, which brings together ontology and semantics, needs to have phenomenology and zero point phenomenology underpinning, along with holistic phenomenal intentionality. Notice that intentionality, and certainly phenomenal narrow intentionality, is the way semantics meets and disciplines the world.

Zero point is an additional dimension that needs to be adjoined to blobjectivist and more broadly austere realist project. In other words, phenomenology needs to be joined to the austere realism project. Zero point and phenomenology needs to be there in a constitutive manner.

What does this mean? One question is how the contextual semantics impinges upon the world. Given that the world is non vague, and that phenomenology as a constitutive matter is non vague as well, the encounter between the world and semantics is thereby possible, although it bears the mark of impossibility.