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Goodness without maximization
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Scalar consequentialism evaluates acts in respect to their goodness as compared to the available alternatives. It rejects maximization, and therewith rightness and wrongness of acts, together with the demand or ought which requires maximizing the value of an act. A question that arises is in what sense the evaluation of an act's goodness in respect to available alternatives escapes maximization strategy. Inclusive disjunction versus exclusive disjunction and transvaluationist approach to vagueness try to shed some light on this issue, together with chromatic illumination account of moral judgment providing a viable monism.

Consequentialist progress

Consequentialism is an overall view requiring maximization of consequences. Utilitarianism is one of its forms. Take it that the amount of pleasure in the world is what morally matters. This then means that an act which brings about more pleasure than a similar one is to be prefered to the later. This leads to *demandingness objection* in respect to consequentialism, in its act consequentialism form. If maximization is really what morally matters, then *just* the best acts measured with it are morally right. One problem with this is that one always should aim for maximal goodness of an act's consequences and for nothing less. But in one's everyday practical activities one most of the times misses the goal of attaining maximal goodness and thus rightness in one's agency. One abstains from maximal *objective* goodness, say, by taking into account one's own preferences or these of one's keen. If this is the case then each of these acts, failing to be maximal, is morally wrong. But at most occasions this value ascription just does not seem to fit the case of a morally decent person, which means most of us. It would be strange to claim that majority of our acts are morally wrong just because they miss the strict mark of perfection.

Demandingness brings with it yet another quirk however, namely that it goes against consequentialist specificity which profiles itself in opposition to *deontology*, the view built upon moral *oughts* and requirements, according to which the basis of morality resides in demands put upon the agent, irrespective of her desires. If maximization is the way to go, then the rightness of each act is *required*. Among other things, this poses a problem for supererogatory acts, for if the best is required through maximization, there is no way to supersede it.

According to maximizing consequentialism, there exists a necessary *inferential* link between goodness and rightness of an act. Moral rightness and wrongness of an act come as extreme binary categories. If an act is maximally *good*, then it is *right*, and it is morally wrong otherwise. This is just another way of expressing the thought that most of our acts are morally wrong.

Maximizing consequentialism with its demandingness seems thus to be unrealistic in evaluation of our everyday moral practices. Besides to this, its specificity in respect to the opposed view of deontology seems to be put under question. So some *slack* seems to be needed in respect to the high demands that it poses.

One obvious way to go is by relaxing the demands for the moral rightness of an act. We can call this the *satisficing* account of acts' moral evaluation. A candidate is an act that misses the maximizing threshold and yet feels as morally good. This is easy to demonstrate for the case of *objective* maximization. Although I do not choose to support with my ressources the most needy persons in the world, such as starving children in a desert on another continent that are complete strangers to me (as is required through *impartiality* professed by maximizing consequentialism), I still may go through as a morally valuable person if I altruistically support my family and keen. It is a common sense opinion which sounds appropriate, namely that we would blame the person who neglects support of his children and keen in profit of some other party, such as his mistress or the mentioned starving children on the other continent. A way to explain this reaction is in noticing that there are other values as just objective maximization of goodness, precisely the ones covering the demand of supporting our keen and caring at least for the elementary basis of our own well-being (without which we would not be able to support anyone else). This would be a *pluralist* way out, where several forces have to be weighted against each other, in a given situation where moral judgment needs to be fallen in which direction to act. But one can perhaps stay with consequentialist monism, allowing for less than perfect results, in respect to maximal requirements. I.e., one's acts will then be still evaluated as morally appropriate, if they are morally good, but do not achieve the utmost consequentialist maximization.

Another move to improve consequentialism, its maximizing form, so that it comes closer to fitting our everyday judgmental practices, is to introduce what is called *scalar consequentialism*. This one namely allows for graded less than perfect actions (less than perfect in respect to maximizing requirements) that still are evaluated as morally good, despite that they may appear well below the maximizing threshold. Such acts will be evaluated as good or bad. But scalar consequentialism does away with right and wrong moral evaluation of acts. Thus the *inferential* link from good to right is dismissed. Why would this be the case? The earlier mentioned reason is the implausibility to go with the digital evaluative extremes of right and wrong in respect to an act's consequences. This does away with too demanding evaluation requirements, and besides to this with the very conception of demandingness. The first one goes along with our practices of attributing moral goodness to many suboptimal acts (sub-optimal in respect to maximizing consequences). Whereas the second one preserves the very specificity of consequentialism, as compared to its opposite deontological way to go: this last one issues demands, while scalar approach to consequentialism can well stay without these. By staying just with evaluation of an act's goodness and dismissing right and wrong, scalar consequentialism is in agreement with consequentialist claim about choosing the best among the available alternatives in a situation, so that this one will still lack perfection of objective maximization.

Here is an illustration of scalar approach plausibility. According to maximizing consequentialism building upon the inference from good to right, only the act of giving 50% of your income to charity will be morally right. And if this is the case, then your act of giving 49% to charity will already be morally wrong. But now, under the presupposition that 50% is morally right, 49% still seem morally right. And even 5% appears morally right, given the amount that people actually and on average tend to give to charity, from the statistical perspective

considering their usual behavior. But all these are morally wrong from the perspective of maximizing consequentialism. Even more, according to the *objective* maximizing consequentialism, you should perhaps give away 95% of your income to charity, staying with 5% that will allow your survival and continuing performance of this kind of acts. Finally, the real objective consequentialist may even reproach you these remaining 5%, and suggest to you that you should give 100% to charity or to some national or international fund that will distribute the resources according to the needs of people, treated in egalitarian manner. Social experiments in this direction however did not finish luckily, extinguishing the productive impact of individuals upon society's flourishing, and failing to extinguish the greed of people that were supposed to distribute resources in an egalitarian manner. In respect to these overall considerations, one may well affirm that giving away 5% of one's income to charity is a morally good act. In respect to optimific approach, one can perhaps still ask whether there is an approximate boundary for an act being right. On the other hand, for scalar consequentialism there is a question whether such a boundary is forthcoming. Scalar consequentialism, as already said, does away with digitally minded rightness and wrongness of acts, staying with the valuation of an act's moral goodness, which comes in degrees. There are several acts that come gradually away from maximization threshold, but are still morally good. The measure of their moral goodness comes by comparing them to available alternatives. Here arises a question though whether the comparison to several possible situations that may be called possible worlds does not amount to *maximization of goodness*, which would just bring the maximizing strategy pertaining to rightness and wrongness back through the back door. There is a possible world where I help an old lady cross the street. And there is another possible world where I mug her. Several possible situations or possible worlds where I act are placed between these. I may be friendly to the old lady while accompanying her, or I may show lack of friendliness or even be unfriendly to her in several degrees at the time of performing my charitable act. Claiming that one needs to choose the act excelling in respect to goodness as compared to its alternatives seems to take us in direction of maximization again: the good act according to which one *should* (notice the deontic intrusion) guide one's behavior is just the one that is maximally good, as it seems. So what is the specificity of scalar consequentialism, as compared to consequentialist maximization retaining rightness and wrongness? One possible answer involves *contextualism*. Notice that maximizing consequentialism has tendency of being impartial, and thus to shift attention away from the specific circumstances in which the agent finds herself. Scalar consequentialist may be willing to retain requirement of impartiality, but by stressing the comparison of possible circumstances in morally evaluating an act, she buys presupposition that the situations or possible worlds to be compared are the ones leaning towards the specific encountered situation. This contextual inclination then goes along with the possibility to recognize scalar goodness of performed acts: an act will be morally good even if it will not be maximizing.

The plan is now to take a look to what extent and by which means *goodness without maximization* can be supported. The expression refers to *scalar consequentialism* in as far as it eliminates or reduces right and wrong in support of degrees of goodness. So some points of scalar consequentialism are reviewed first. In what follows, several possibilities of this view's support will be discussed, in light of escaping maximization threat in the area of goodness: vagueness, inclusive disjunction, chromatic illumination and contextualism.

Scalar consequentialism

The author of scalar consequentialism approach Alastair Norcross takes it to be in accord with utilitarianism as one of its forms, claiming that consequences of acts are what morally matters in these acts' evaluation. He dismisses rightness and wrongness and stays with graded evaluation of acts' goodness.

> "Utilitarianism should not be seen as giving an account of right action, in the sense of action *demanded* by morality, but only as giving an account of what states of affairs are good and which actions are better than which other possible alternatives and how much. The fundamental moral fact about an action is how good it is relative to other available alternatives. Once a range of options has been evaluated in terms of goodness, all the morally relevant facts about those options have been discovered. There is no further fact of the form 'x is right', 'x is to-be-done' or 'x is demanded by morality'." (Norcross)

Obviously, the main accent is upon doing away with rightness and wrongness as sources of *demand*. One just evaluates actions in respect to their goodness, without that requirements would be imposed upon these. But what then incites one to follow good action, best standing among the available alternatives? What would *motivate* one to choose the best alternative as evaluated by its goodness and not perhaps the worst one?

The answer is that goodness is an *intrinsic value* which has as it seems a *motivating* oomph to be pursued. But just why would it not then end up in to-be-pursuendess metaphysical weirdness criticized by error theory? This is a question to keep in mind. Norcross goes against what he calls "causal fetishism", which invites us to take a look at *experiential phenomenology* that may fit his approach. Here are his theses:

> "*Value*: There is such a thing as intrinsic value, and some things have it. Some things are just good, or desirable, or worth having or pursuing for their own sakes.
>
> *Act Relevance*: Intrinsic value provides reasons for action. That one outcome contains more intrinsic goodness than another is, or at least provides, a reason to act in such a way that the former rather than the latter occurs.
>
> *Act Irrelevance*: Nothing other than intrinsic value provides reasons for action." (Norcross)

From these theses it follows that there is indeed a compass which allows to measure acts in respect to their goodness, as compared to the available alternatives, and thus provides a guide to action. This is *intrinsic value*. One such intrinsic value is friendship, and another is the beauty of this painting. Notice now that neither of these is pursued on the basis of an *ought* or a *demand*, namely it is not pursued in this manner *qua* intrinsic value. The relation of friendship does not come from an *ought*; real friendship does not have its roots in moral demands. Additionally, I may become a friend with you with the aim of inheriting a fortune. But this is then not engaging into friendship as an intrinsic value. In fact, this would not be my friendship with you at all if you give it a thought. People that just try to profit from somebody are not really

friends of his, in fact they are not this person's friends at all. Similarly it goes for this painting's beauty. I may admire and study the painting in order to improve my overall views with the hope to get promoted. Promotion aim would be just instrumental and certainly would not have intrinsic value. Improving my overall views and sensitivity though seems to be an intrinsic value. Yet this would not be intrinsic value of painting's beauty but rather this value would be instrumentally used in support of another intrinsic value.

People though often spend their times acting in order to attain instrumental value. Perhaps the majority acts in order to assure their financial independence and thereby their wellbeing, so that they can then eventually engage in pursuit of intrinsic value, such as the mentioned friendship and admiring of aesthetic beauty. It would be strange to claim that these people do not have any reasons for their actions. Given that ultimately in order to pursue intrinsic values several instrumental values need to be pursued, at different levels, it would be strange to say that acts leading to these would not involve any reasons for action. This would then go against the Act Irrelevance thesis. Does this lead to distinguish *genuine* intrinsic value pursuing existence from the instrumental non-genuine way to be? This would seem strange, reminding one on existential authenticity approaches.

Presupposing now that there are things with intrinsic value providing *reasons for action*, i.e. that there is a *motivating* force of value, leaves us with the question whether this value pushes one to *maximization*, in the given circumstances well understood, to choose just the best available action. If scalar approach is adequate, various distances from this goal will be forthcoming. But does this mean that all these remote solutions, even for a small distance, are not morally good and thus need to be exchanged with the one offering *most* of goodness? This would move in a kind of *requirement* again, which by its nature seems to be alien to things with intrinsic value. Perhaps goodness without maximization though goes just with intrinsic value.

Expression "scalar" comes from satisficing utilitarianism which allows that less than maximal acts are good. This means that several *grades* of good actions are possible, which goes against quest for threshold coming along with maximization. Notice that this threshold will be *arbitrary*, which supports scalar approach. Assigning winning position in athletic sports shows arbitrariness since we assign winning position to the first, and to the first three, although their achievements are really quite similar, differing only in fractions of seconds or in millimeters. Even stranger is the position of these tiny differences for the place of 7 and 8, neither of which really gets real attention, despite being perhaps very close to the winner in absolute result, most certainly as compared to my trials as an outsider to these sports. The distinction between morally worse state of affairs and between its slightly better neighbor may not be more important as the distinction between members of a pair somewhere in the middle of the scale.

A main statement of scalar utilitarianism is in abolishing rightness and wrongness in evaluation of acts and therewith the demands that come with these digital concepts.

The idea is that If demands are dispensed with, then one is able to answer three questions imposed upon consequentialism in respect to its maximizing feature. This provides "reasons for action" and answers to objections that consequentialism "demands too much sacrifice of agents, leaves inadequate room for moral freedom and does not allow for supererogation" (Norcross 2006). The starting ideas are that by allowing acts to be good even if not maximally but just gradually so, supererogation is still possible, contrary to its elimination

through maximizing platform (if maximally fitting acts *need* to be done, there is no room for maximization indeed). Moral freedom is as well allowed in an environment without ultimate demands. and sacrifice of the agent is not required either in such an environment.

The just given account of scalar consequentialism certainly needs some further discussion and elaboration. We will try this out through consideration of some points such as vagueness, inclusive disjunction, chromatic illumination and contextualism. How do these help to escape maximization threat in push to the best between available alternatives or possible worlds in respect to their goodness?

Possible worlds

Scalar consequentialism allows less than maximal acts to be evaluated as morally good through ditching right and wrong distinction in favor of comparison of this act's goodness with other relevant possible situations differing from it to some not too distant extent. In order to keep its consequentialist commitment, the act into which one engages should be the best of the pack. But this is now going into direction of maximization again, as the good act to be pursued in accordance with consequentialist recommendations needs to win the peak in comparing with others. Consequentialist will balk about the proposal to involve agent's *intention*, for this would bring her away from monistic engagement into the direction of the pursuit of intrinsic value, and closer to deontic waters.

The first question is whether there exists an arrangement of possible worlds that would allow avoiding strict maximization. The answer for this is affirmative: possible worlds may be *ranged* in respect to the maximal goal (goal of maximal goodness), so that there is a range or series of them which gradually approach this maximum. Nothing in this series though *obliges* directedness towards the maximum, the maximally good situation. Statistically, this may be just the ascend towards the maximum, or descent from it, depending from which angle you take a look.

The position of scalar consequentialism though, all in bashing the maximizing right and wrong distinction, stays with *comparison* between several possible situations or possible worlds, measured in respect to the amount of goodness which they provide. Now, given that scalar consequentialism dismisses *oughts* or *demands*, one can say that its direction is towards the best possible world as measured through its goodness, but that there is *no need* to attain this maximal point. One may stay *approximately close* to the best goodness involving situation. But as there is *no need* to attain it, one may stay as well close to it to different extent considering one's choices. This would then introduce goodness of approximate situations and possible worlds, without perhaps that there would exist strict division between good and bad acts. This is exactly what one wants to avoid: strict boundary between maximal points, such as the ones involving rightness and wrongness. Lack of *demand* thus helps to maintain a graded, scalar approach to an acts' evaluation.

Notice that the expression scalar has as well the meaning of bringing together the sum of several forces, in the mathematical account of dynamical processes of this kind. In the mathematical sense, scalar facts just give frame for direction to take place, without pushing for this direction to be there in a decisive and final manner. "Scalars are real numbers used in linear algebra, as opposed to vectors. "(Scalar (mathematics): Wikipedia) Vectors' coordinates and

length are scalars, whereas vector itself is not a scalar. Given that vector shows a *direction*, the graded ladder-like approach to scalars do not determine an ultimate direction, but just approximate approach to that direction. If one is pluralist, there is a multiplicity of principles that one encounters in a situation, each of these providing a force pointing into some direction. Falling of judgment now considers all of these forces following their corporate direction. But the ultimate vector will not be strictly determined through scalar measures, although these will give it some approximate direction. Taking possible worlds on board along this line may present comparison of goodness in respect to several situations as involving several considerations, perhaps directed towards the ideal, but realistically complying to the graded scalar sum of forces. In pluralism one would take action not just involving one principle, but several of these as they appear in the situation at hand. Now monism such as consequentialism may go for goodness, and yet take account of several pressures or forces that will take it away on a gradual scale from the aimed ideal. In addition to this, consequentialist may refrain from pursuing the maximal point of goodness as an ideal, for this would bring him to a kind of rule-consequentialism. The scalar approach however goes along with act consequentialism, which takes evaluation of an actual *act* as its target, and not a general *rule* that would be there stretching over several acts and maybe serving as an ideal point. Given that act consequentialism does not subscribe to any such ideal point, the scalar or graded approach to goodness is then allowed for.

Going back to the question of possible worlds and maximization of goodness, we can say that there is nothing in the possible world setting that would *oblige* the maximization turn. Possible worlds in their graded approach to goodness allow for gradation and scalar way to go, especially if one refuses to take *demands* or *oughts* on board.

Possible worlds or situations are as well *possible environments*. One can distinguish *local, global and transglobal* environments. Local environment is the one where things actually happen, in a restricted and contextually targeted manner. Global environment would then involve the whole world and not just local environment. It would provide resistance to skeptical local considerations, the ones that appear in the local environment. Now, transglobal environment would provide resistance to skeptical considerations in global environment, especially to the global daemonic skeptical hypothesis. This transglobal environment though, given that it deals with *global skeptical environment* challenge, happens to be *narrow* and *qualitative phenomenological experience* involving environment. As such, it goes well along with the *intrinsic value* measure of *comparative goodness* of worlds. Thus, there may be local and then global worlds/situations compared in respect to goodness of an act. But the real proper ultimate environment of an acts' goodness comparison is that of *transglobal, phenomenological experience* adapted environment, fitting to the qualitative goodness of the envisaged *intrinsic value* as the relevant issue.

Inclusive disjunction

Since scalar consequentialism does away with oughts and demands, it is natural for it to allow for mixed and intertwining solutions. Oughts namely push you to extremes. A look at examples used by deontology shows that dramatic settings are required. This has the tendency to spill into consequentialism. Would you kill the fat man? Would you allow one to die in order to save

five? But scalar consequentialism typically goes for less dramatic and more up to daily concerns involving acts. These are where several forces get involved into a single situation that one considers, allowing for graded approach and intermingling of the involved matters.

One main characteristics of scalar consequentialism consists in disposing with rightness and wrongness in respect to moral evaluation of an act. It is sufficient in its view to compare goodness of an act with its relevant alternatives. Rightness and wrongness are tied to maximization of consequences of an act: just the best act in respect to its consequences is right, whereas the rest of them are morally wrong. This is a case of *exclusive disjunction*, which urges you to choose one of alternatives at the expense of the other one. As we already hinted at, such approach is *binary* and *digital*: there are two options between which one can and needs to choose, and there is a clear cut distinction between these options. Once as one chooses one of the options, the other one is squeezed out of the equation.

As against this exclusive disjunction approach, scalar consequentialism opts for *inclusive disjunction*. This allows for combination of two choices, in direction of a combined choice. Gradation namely *tends* to lean in direction of goodness, in direction of the best between alternatives, but it also goes towards what would be just called its other pole. If this would be rightness and wrongness maximization attribution, these would protrude one into another. There is just tendency for an act to follow rightness in these terms, but it in fact also involves the stretch into the opposite, wrongness direction. But as we said, there is no rightness and wrongness attribution for scalar consequentialism, given that maximization extremes are ruled out, together with the *demandingness* and deontic *oughtness* stuff that this involves. So staying just with comparative goodness of an act's moral evaluation intertwines both poles. In this respect, one can look at scalar, less than extreme evaluation, as staying with both poles at once. But this still does not solve the problem *to what extent* the evaluation of goodness can avoid maximization. Perhaps in the sense that doing away with rightness and wrongness excludes demands and requirements to go into one specific direction. If the gradation of goodness less than maximal point is feasible, then goodness inherently involves both rightness and wrongness, if one would be able to talk like that (given that these last ones were eliminated or reduced). The very fact of scalar evaluation goes in the sense of inclusive disjunction. I have opted for such an approach in other areas as well. Let me just mention transglobal reliabilism-evidentialism in the area of epistemology. This view starts with local environment, encounters skeptical hypotheses (this was mentioned in the former section already), and deals with them in global environment. Now, global environment gets challenged through daemonic skepticism, which requires transglobal qualitative narrow environment to provide an appropriate response. In respect to epistemic justification, one may start with reliabilist local environment, and following the just mentioned steps finishes up with reliabilism-evidentialism involving transglobal environment. This is then intertwining of the reliabilism and evidentialism epistemic justification opposites, along the lines of inclusive disjunction.

Paradoxes offer another case of inclusive disjunction. One definition of paradox takes it to be coming together of incompatible and inconsistent propositions. Now, such an approach would characterize paradox as something inconvenient, given that there is the presupposition of the excluded middle lurking in the background. This is of course exclusive disjunction tactics. If one appropriates its opposite, inclusive disjunction, paradox then appears like something

desirable, similar to poetic experience that may perhaps be characterized as coming together of inconsistent proposition in a single setting, producing qualitative phenomenological experience as its desired outcome.

Vagueness

The next thing that is close to scalar approach and that may elucidate it is *vagueness*. Doing away with rightness and goodness in evaluation of an act namely does away with the strict *boundary* between the maximal situation and all the rest. Involving *scalar* way to go and *gradation* thus embraces *vagueness*, which according to my understanding is characterized by *boundarylessness*. The approach to vagueness I subscribe to is called *transvaluationism*. It is a generic approach which includes several attempts, such as supervaluation, that try to smuggle in the boundary without being really successful in doing so. So transvaluationism as generic approach is opposed to *epistemicism,* the view that there is a boundary for a vague term, which however is not epistemically accessible: although there is such a boundary upon the sorites sequence, we are unable to know about it, to epistemically assess it. This is what epistemicist claims.

Once as gradation of scalar approach is introduced, vagueness is close to it. Doing away with maximization, and with the opposition between right and wrong that is coming with it, there is no strict boundary anymore to deal with. And this is exactly what scalar consequentialism has in mind as well. Goodness with which it stays may be compared to vague terms such as being rich or being bald.

Notice that *transvaluationist* approach to vagueness in fact introduces *qualitative phenomenological* environment, if we recall recent discussion of *trans*global environment for the case of epistemic justification and for *intrinsic value's* such as *goodness* proper environment. This one is *trans*global environment, as we have claimed, *phenomenological qualitative experience* fitting. Once as one enjoys boundarylessness and its quality, it is natural to abolish rigid and dramatical attempts at maximizing.

Contextualism

A characteristic of scalar consequentialism through which it affirms its specificity in respect to maximization is *contextualism*. Once as extremes of rightness and wrongness are abandoned as measures of an act's evaluation, a more homely environment comes upon the stage, where comparison with relevant and close alternative situations or possible worlds becomes important. This brings along *contextualism*, which is quite repugnant in its nature towards extreme exclusivist dramatic choices. Comparison within context goes along with close worlds as compared to these that one finds in objectivist maximization attuned indifferent environment.

One may compare contextualist measure of the goodness of an act in respect to close worlds to an *indirect* manner of proceeding. The maximalist exclusivist approach may be compared to *direct* attaining of the boundary, with exclusion of other considerations. This difference is then close to an approach to truth as either indirect or again as direct correspondence, the first one going along with ontic and the second one with ontological metaphysics. *Indirect* contextualist approach goes well with scalar consequentialism, as we understand.

Chromatic illumination

Moral evaluation of an act may either proceed through a judgment involving principles, or one may understand such a judgment as emotional gut reactions to the encountered circumstances. This last approach is quite popular, recognizing role of principles just in explanatory confabulation in one's judgment justification. The presupposition is that either principles are directly present to consciousness, or that they have no role at all. Contrary to this goes the position of *chromatic rationalism* which gives their role to principles in moral judgment formation, yet claims that these do not have a direct, but rather *indirect* impact. There is a holistic background knowledge that mostly fails to be explicit, and yet it forms the basis upon which judgments are fallen. So there is not just explicitly present content around, but also background content which is active in belief and content formation, shedding its light upon the encountered situation. This is how principles *illuminate* the situation. And this fits with our phenomenological experiences while we fall the judgment. We do not explicitly announce the content of principles, but rather leave them to exercise their influence from the morphological background, in an indirect *illuminating* manner.

Scalar consequentialism is *monism*, for it goes with one intrinsic value, moral goodness. Scalar approach provides general direction, which means the one that allows for cague, say, scalar approximation to direction, without finishing up in that direction's exact maximizing boundary. Scalars may be attributed as graded indications of dimensions, which give approximate hints but not strict and ultimate direction vector of maximizing kind. So although that consequentialism is monism, one can recognize various forces along several dimensions indicating the scalarly approximated range of vicinities, which may be understood as the relevant contextually appearing worlds or situations. One monistic principle, that of goodness, may thus provide general direction, without providing necessary path towards maximization.

Phenomenological experience of goodness value

The idea is that there is no demand or requirement to engage into good action, just comparison of the performed action to its alternatives. Given that comparison between available alternatives resembles possible worlds, in direction of *intrinsic value* (goodness), it goes along with *phenomenological qualitative experience*. Such an experience is best forthcoming in *transglobal, again* phenomenologically founded environment. So the value of goodness comes as evaluated in several dimensions including *phenomenology*.