

## How to come from the current treatments of *moral judgment* to the *genuine moral judgment*?

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1. What is *ethics* about? It is about *moral judgment* and its consequences.
  - a. A short spiel about *judgment*. Aristotelian and Brentanian tradition against Fregean elimination of judgment in profit of the supposedly nonvague reasoning (which is impossible if succeeding in language-thought and may only be effective in arithmetical writing). The overall rejection of judgment had consequences for moral theory and ethics as well.
  - b. Moral judgment has *subjective engagement* side: it is me or yourself who make moral judgments. Moral judgment also has an *objective engagement* side: society establishes laws and juridical codes on the basis of what its members *judge* to be morally right.
  - c. Moral judgment exercises *valuative* assessment of actual or possible situations.
  - d. The *valuation* of moral judgment applies to human *agency*: what people do, how they behave.
  - e. Moral judgment being related to human agency depends on *free agency* conditions.
  - f. Practices of (moral) *praise and blame*, *moral desert* have as its precondition *free agency* and *core optionality* (ability to make a free choice). If someone has no free will and no core optionality he cannot be subject to moral evaluation of praise and blame, of moral desert ascriptions. (One is condemned to freedom according to Sartre).
  - g. Although it is I myself that form moral judgments, from my experiential zero point, I *phenomenologically experience* my moral judgments as not just involving myself, but as involving other people, wider community. This is why I experience moral judgments not as a matter of taste but as something other people should comply to. In experiencing moral judgment thereby I experience *normative pressure* from the side of community, and I as well think that my moral judgments should be adopted by the whole community.
  - h. I experience moral judgments as something *objective*, independent from my subjective wishes and desires, although their source is in my wishes and desires, in the basis of my *agency* (they are not at the cognitive side of my psychological experiences).
  - i. Am I *free*? Because of my *subjective* zero point source of my *agency* I have *direct intuitive experience* of being free. These are *libertarian* satisfaction conditions for freedom. But these libertarian satisfaction conditions that I experience do not lead me to correctly access free will. Rather, freewill satisfaction conditions are compatibilist.

j. There is no direct intuitive path to assess freewill satisfaction conditions. For conditions of free will, agency, and for moral evaluation *do not depend* on my subjective assessment only. They depend upon some *objective* (community involving) forces. So their assessment has to be indirect, just like juridical (code of conduct involving manner) matters as well proceed indirectly, stressing through this that community is involved into judgment and evaluation.

2. What is *genuine moral judgment*?


- a. Genuine moral judgment is *agentive*, it is *not cognitive*. (Nondescriptive cognitivism is wrong in that they take moral judgment to be belief or belief like, for moral judgment is not cognitive. So the title cognitivism is misguided for this position, in respect to the real nature of moral judgment.)
- b. Genuine moral judgment is *phenomenology constituted*; it is phenomenologically experienced as *objective*, independent from one's immediate wishes and desires.
- c. Genuine moral judgment is *agentive*, related to human agency and its evaluation; it is *not* cognitivist.


3. The way moral theory treated moral judgment.

- a. First came *cognitivism*. Moral judgment was supposed to be *belief* or belief like. So then as belief it was supposed to describe some reality. So cognitivism was package deal with moral realism.
- b. Then came *noncognitivism*, as reaction to cognitivism. Moral judgment was supposed to be emotional reaction to the encountered circumstances. As there was no description or truth/falsity assignment related to such approach, it was concluded that moral judgment comes in package deal with *irrealism*.
- c. Both these approaches are deeply misguided about the genuine moral judgment nature. It is not belief, it is agentive and so free will and core optionality supportive.
- d. Why did this misguided approach to moral judgment happen? Answer: Moore tried to establish *metaethical* approach to moral philosophy (in opposition to applied and normative ethics). So he first aimed to provide *definitions* of such basic moral terms as moral Goodness that would determine these concepts' precise extensions. So he needed *description* and truth/falsity ascribing procedure. So he bought *beliefs* as moral judgments. So he *reduced* moral judgment to belief, we say. That was cognitivism. Noncognitivism was just the denial of this departure that established the manner to treat moral judgment.

4. The curious indirect paths moral theory and ethics took by trying to get back to the genuine moral judgment from its reduction to cognitivism-realism/noncognitivism-irrealism package deals.

- a. *Error theory*. Crossed the line between cognitivism-realism and between noncognitivism-irrealism by bringing cognitivism to join irrealism. Moral judgments are still beliefs (following thereby established tradition), but they are all in error, because irrealism is true (there are no moral entities or properties which beliefs aim at).
  - b. *How does error theory approach genuine moral judgment?* Error theory realized that there is something deeply wrong with treating moral judgment as belief, as a cognitivist descriptive state. The patterns of objectification were still recognized, i.e. moral judgment having an *experiential objective* side. It was wrongly supposed though that this is a matter of belief property (the same mistake continued by cognitivist expressivism).
  - c. *Nondescriptivist cognitivism*. It realized that *beliefs* have two sides to them: (i) *descriptive* side: they describe some reality and so they can be assessed as true/false; (ii) *psychological* side: beliefs are experienced as something objective and independent of our immediate wishes/desires. So *nondescriptive cognitivism* concludes that moral judgments are *phenomenologically experienced* as objective just as beliefs are, and that beliefs are *theoretically agentive* (although they are not practically agentive: and this is the fault in assessment of moral judgment that nondescriptivist cognitivism falls prey to).
  - d. *How does nondescriptive cognitivism approach genuine moral judgment?* The answer is that it goes further than error theory in that it digs into the nature of belief that it feels is not appropriate for moral judgment real nature. It discovers that moral judgment is *not descriptive*, which was not challenged by error theory yet. In this sense nondescriptive cognitivism comes slightly closer to the nature of moral judgment, in opposition to cognitivism-realism/noncognitivism-irrealism package deals. But it is still deeply wrong to think that moral judgment could be assessed by beliefs at all.
  - e. *Noncognitivist error theory*. This is a further shift in direction of coming back to genuine moral judgment. Why? Because there is a shift towards *noncognitivism*, i.e. towards the *agentive* side of psychological experiences that are in the basis of moral judgment. But there is still the wrongful presupposition of error here, which takes along the attachment to belief, cognitivism, although in an error manner.
5. Coming back to *genuine moral judgment*.
- a. We can help ourselves by the following Brentanian figure of psychological experiences.





Brentano took it that beliefs are cognitive, and so are thoughts. But he held it that *moral* and ethical realm is to be found at the *emotional* side of psychological experiences. So it is deeply wrong to place them at the cognitive side.

- b. Now, moral judgment is not just desire, which is passive psychological experience. Moral judgment has to do with agency (which allows for moral blame, moral desert ascriptions and so for the free will). So moral judgments goes along with *strivings* at the emotional side of *agentive* psychological experiences. Now, Meinongian interpretation has it that *values or oughts* are *objects* that are correlated to the experiences of strivings.
- c. Moral judgments are our psychological experiences that aim at *values*. So they are strivings, we strive towards the realm of values as we fall moral judgment. Oughts are the objects in question. They are experienced as objective, as normative and as requiring. (Veber introduced them in Meinong's school, and Ernst Mally established deontic logic.)