

## Belief Puzzle

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Belief puzzle is introduced, with its two aspects of belief-formation and of belief entertaining in view of possible actions. There is a tension between these in that the first one does not include agency, whereas the second one does. It is puzzling that our innermost supported convictions and activities have their roots in a source which is basically beyond our control. A first impression of this situation is provided, including overall directions of belief's agentic involvement and of its nature. Puzzle concerning the mentioned strands of belief is delineated. Some points are discussed, such as the worry about absence of tension, and whether we deal with a paradox. Tension underlying belief puzzle is put into a broader perspective, shedding some light upon how to approach it.

### Belief Puzzle

As one reaches a certain age it is perhaps on time to ask oneself what one believes. As a philosopher, I start to tackle preconditions of this difficult question by trying to provide some clarity about belief -- what it is and how it behaves.

I met a prominent skeptic once and this is what he told me: If you start reading a book and if it does not trigger your interest at its first page, you better dismiss it. This I understand as an invitation to start my inquiry with a puzzle, for this one may provide food for thought. A certain point may serve as a crystal that guides you for miles, as I remember from my pre-doctoral study advice. If skeptic urges you to start the inquiry with an attractive point, he means that you can get certain results, although these may not lead you to the real ultimate certainty. My friend with whom I collaborate for quite some time now takes puzzles as starting points of his thinking and elaboration. In fact, he drew my attention to the following one<sup>1</sup> :

(B) Belief-formation may succeed in an involuntary manner, and yet it is phenomenologically experienced as inhabiting one's rational space of reasons.

Call this (B) *belief puzzle*. But just why would it be a puzzle? We humans are rational beings, freedom being a part of our rational pride and awareness. So it is strange that something which is so close to our hearts and to our rational constitution as beliefs is as well something that we acquire in an involuntary manner, without our willful engagement. It is even stranger then that we are ready to defend with our actions *something which we have no grip over* in respect to

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<sup>1</sup> People hinted at in this paragraph in order of appearance are Barry Stroud (whom I met in Oxford in 1987 and earlier at the occasion of Kirchberg Wittgenstein conference), Jacques-Alain Miller (my Paris troisieme cycle advisor proposing theory of description controversy as my PhD topics) and Terry Horgan (with whom I spent the year of 1996 in Memphis as Fulbright fellow). The wording of puzzle (B) is mine. What I here address as belief puzzle was proposed by Terry Horgan as part of the overall topics of our joint Bled 2015 Epistemology and philosophy of mind symposium presentation concerning Epistemic quasi-agency in the space of reasons. Mark Timmons and Vojko Strahovnik later joined as co-authors of this four persons collaborative work in progress whose aim is to propose our view of inferences. Here I elaborate some points of this project.

how we acquire it, which gets imposed upon us in an alien independent-of-our-will manner. Our actions are something we stand behind for they are based upon *reasons* that we endorse. But beliefs are often imposed upon us without our rational agreement, either through reflexive reactions to the encountered environment, from the side of authority, or from the levelling force of common opinion.<sup>2</sup>

These characteristics of belief-formation and of its motivation providing force are exploited by advertising industry. As I watch movie on my TV set there are advertisements promoting brands of soda-water and of cars. At the moment as I watch them I actually hate these advertisements for they distract the flow of the movie and seem to make no real sense. But later then as I shop in the mall I buy that particular brand of soda-water, and eventually some day I purchase the car advertised on my TV. Yet other advertisements may be financed by some political party. In many cases, this way of belief-formation succeeds quite independently of my willful engagement. And yet, once as beliefs are acquired I treat them as my own beliefs, and I am ready to defend them in discussion and through my actions. Companies are willing to pay a lot in order to form some of our beliefs, and political parties, including totalitarian regimes, are well aware of advertisements' propaganda efficacy. Centers of financial or political power thus know about the importance of their investment in our belief-formation, for the areas of influence in which they have their interest.

Chomsky poses two questions about human beings' *rationality*: How is it possible that we know as much as we do, displaying through this the power of our rationality? And again: How is it possible that we are at the same time so dumb and irrational?<sup>3</sup> The first of these questions he addresses through the *knowledge of language*: we possess an immense structured ability to form grammatically well-formed sentences, which the study of generative grammar tries to elucidate in an empirical manner, through the ever refined hypotheses about this innate linguistic capability. The second question gets its name from Orwell and it targets human readiness to behave in an irrational manner, first of all in political arena. It addresses the problem that despite being perhaps the only rational animals, we are immensely dumb as we get massively manipulated through the skilfully served political propaganda. Whereas our rationality displaying knowledge of language is not related to our beliefs, but rather to our *syntactic* capabilities, the often present irrational behavior of human species in political matters

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<sup>2</sup> I guess this last one is what Heidegger calls "man", i.e. an impersonal instance to which he opposes qualitative existence. Without reflection we often adopt whatever trends as accepted opinion. Notice as well that we are prone to defend our family and our country, despite that in neither of these cases our willfull decision lead to our membership; we rather became parts of these on the basis of circumstances that are far away from our voluntary control. A person who does not *believe* in his country or in his family is often excluded and treated as a traitor.

<sup>3</sup> Chomsky 1986. Linguistics engagement is relational, dealing with the syntax as an innate dispositional capability; in this sense it approaches thin line of the social and reason-ish engagement. Generative grammarians empirically consult intuitions about correctness of specific linguistic strings, which is a normative enterprise. They do not touch the world-directed relation of semantic referential content. See the next footnote. It may be interesting to compare Chomsky's views concerning rules and representations: do they avoid referential engagement with the non-rational world, where *causal* relations are supposed to result in semantic content involving sense?

directly concerns beliefs and the manner in which they get formed. Tackling puzzle (B) may bring some clarification to this area.<sup>4</sup>

But why is (B) a puzzle? It is curious that something which we take to be the basis of our rationality, of our *beliefs*, is obtained in an *involuntary* manner, which makes us a prey for advertising enterprises of either commercial or political provenience. We certainly feel that we *act rationally* on the basis of our beliefs, of our rational convictions. But factual *beliefs*, all in being part of our rational constituency, inhabiting the *space of reasons*, are actually acquired in a non-rational and even as it happens in an irrational manner, quite removed from our responsible command of the situation. This *involuntary* nature of belief-formation, escaping our rational and willful control however occupies a quite different space as it becomes an accepted basis for our acting and dispositions to act. Now beliefs inhabit our rational space of reasons. The tension between involuntariness of belief-formation which is alien to agency, and between agency supporting formed belief results in a puzzle. Given that beliefs which we entertain provide main support for our actions, and that we mostly aim to act rationally upon their basis -- isn't it strange that these beliefs have their roots in causally supported, many times irrational or at least no rationality involving formation processes with dark provenience as measured with one's agentive engagement? Are people really condemned to sometimes or even often use their agency, which in their best faith happens to be grounded in their rational constituency, in what disguises itself as an irrational or at least rationality and agency avoiding formation process?

Belief-formation of factual beliefs may be non-rational, without basically involving higher cognitive processes. It happens with predominant influence from the *space of causes*. Why is this the case? Factual beliefs are guidelines for our actions, and in everyday situations these are often needed without delay, without involvement of a lengthy rumination process. This may be related to reasons of survival, as follow-up of the search for and inclination towards *truth* as belief-formation's ultimate goal. In this respect *truth* seems to be opposed to rationality, for it has its roots in the encounter with the world. Rationality is namely related to action, and action aims to change or improve the world according to our desires -- which may be supported by beliefs. But factual beliefs themselves are not agentive, despite that they may well underlie the direction of our action. The main *goal* of belief-formation is *truth*. One needs to form *true beliefs*, in order to act successfully in one's surroundings. Perceptual beliefs should better be true. As on my forest walk I encounter a fierce bear and form false belief that this is a nice lost doggy needing

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<sup>4</sup> Notice that beliefs are semantic, distinct in this from the syntactic mastering of language. Now, semantics brings along with it several puzzles, such as the ones related to reference and meaning. Semantic puzzles may have their roots in the difference between belief-formation and belief-entertainment in view of a possible action. Take the famous semantic puzzle about the actual king of France: referential story targets belief-acquisition (if we kind of stick to our terminology), and it is often provided in causal terms (historical causal link). Belief-entertainment story is concerned with the agentive dimension of usage of that belief-content in communication-intention contexts. Reference is treated here as providing content of the corresponding belief. The causal, historical side of the story refers to the world, whereas the communication-intention side treats the supposed referential content as *reason* to engage in one or in another manner in the intersubjective contextual setting. This by the way shows that *contextualism* is enabled through *reasons*, and certainly not through causes, although these may figure as its preconditions. Given that reference as relation aims at the world, it has to be non-vague. On the other hand, reason-ish involvements of communication-intention are well vague and contextually conditioned.

my help, I may get in trouble. I also better form true belief that fast cars are driving as I try to cross the road, and not that some friendly fun flower procession is slowly rolling down the street inviting me to join their dancing practices. As just mentioned, true beliefs give me better chances for survival. On the one hand it is obviously rational for me to form true beliefs. But as these beliefs get formed, they should be construed bottom-up, directly leaning upon the reflex-like encounter with the world that hopefully leads to truth. They should not be rationality induced top-down inferential construals mirroring my wishes. The bare truth that comes from the world through my beliefs should better not be influenced by my desires and through my attention and time consuming inferential powers. It is certainly rational for me to act upon the basis of *true* beliefs and not upon my ungrounded projections into the world. Beliefs themselves, if they should be true, need not just be product of our rational capabilities. Rather, they need to be in-formed reflex-like in order to catch the truth about how the world is. This reflexive bottom-up belief-formation with its dark non-rational source on the side of the world (the world as such is not rational, as rationality and vagueness are on the side of language-thought and not on the side of the world that is independent of these) can later on serve as the basis for our rational activities, such as verbally defending our beliefs, and for our action displaying engagements as a further practical defense of our beliefs. The puzzle involving belief-formation displays couples in tension, such as *involuntariness* and inhabiting *rational space of reasons*, and again *reflexively obeying* the feedback of the world on the one hand, and *acting freely and supposedly rationally* on the basis of this *dark encounter with the world* crystallizing in the formed belief. That's the puzzle which merits to be tackled.

One may reply that our beliefs are not involuntary, especially if we wish to defend our sensitivity which should underlie their formation. Many times, as persons with decent sensibility, we do take some effort and even sometimes a considerable effort in forming our beliefs. So as I try to form a belief about the concept of a reason, I should better take a look at the vast literature dealing with reasons, in order to be philosophically informed, and I should discuss the question with my peers. Only then may I responsibly form belief about reasons as a philosopher. It cannot be denied that we often form beliefs after we have accomplished some research and through our willful engagement to clarify belief's content. So a disclaimer is needed, actually steering attention at a matter that was already mentioned. The beliefs that we talk about here are the usual *factual* beliefs, of which perceptual beliefs are a species. These are beliefs that figure in the (B) puzzle. It is important that we act appropriately, as we get informed through them in respect to the direction that they offer about how to react to the environment.

As we specify that beliefs in puzzle (B) are *factual*, they are delimited from their *normative* or *moral* kin. Normative beliefs namely invoke complications in respect to advocates and opponents of moral realism. If I believe that I ought to do A, does this involve the existence of something such as obligation, or does it just express my engagement? In order to avoid this type of questions, we simply restrict our inquiry to factual beliefs, as just said. If I see the cat on the mat, I form the belief that the cat is on the mat. There is a causal relation between myself forming the belief in question and between the cat sitting there that prompted me to form that belief, and to behave appropriately. As I later walk out of the room I should better avoid stepping on that mat.

Further, some maintain that belief-formation on occasion can be voluntary, an exercise of the “will to believe” and others deny this. We stay neutral in this respect and just affirm that we deal with episodes of *involuntary* belief-formation. This allows us to have a clearly delineated tension between involuntary, out of our hands sources of belief-formation, and between the voluntary and rational engagement of ours in being disposed to act and acting on the basis of our entertained beliefs. Anyway, as we talk about factual beliefs, we also deal with perhaps the simplest cases of belief-formation, such as the ones of perceptual provenience. And it may be an appropriate guiding indication to start with simple cases, only later becoming attentive upon the more complex ones.

The challenge which is proposed by belief puzzle (B) is tension between *involuntary* sources of belief-formation and between *voluntary* agency on the basis of belief once as this one is formed. Obviously *some* relation to *agency* is involved in both of these cases. In episodes of my factual belief-formation the agency is *not* on my side, but on that of the outside world that prompts them. The agency which may lead me towards my engagement into action on the basis of my belief once that one is formed however, is *voluntary* -- at least it is phenomenologically experienced like that -- and it sometimes happens following my explicit deliberation, although more often the direction of my agency is informed by illumination coming from reasons that beliefs provide in the circumstances at hand.

Is this a kind of predicament concerning our rationality, which is destined to try its best although it is forthcoming from sources that do and need not involve any rationality, but perhaps something such as causal processes?

It may be asked whether (B) is a puzzle indeed, or whether we have to do with some other phenomenon here, such as *paradox*. What is the difference between the two? Let us take a brief look at two known paradoxes, Liar and Sorites. In the case of Liar, Epimenides puts himself in a paradoxical situation. He is the inhabitant of a certain island, and he expresses opinion about all of inhabitants living on that island being liars. Given that he himself is an inhabitant of that island, he finds himself in the situation of being as it seems both included and excluded from the lying inhabitants community. If all of them are liars he belongs into that set. Falling a judgment about them however he somehow exempts himself from the bunch. Being both included and excluded in a set, Epimenides finds himself in a paradoxical or what seems to be contradictory position. Paradox seems to breach the law of noncontradiction. Does Epimenides speak the truth? Given his curious paradoxical situation, you just cannot really tell. Take now Sorites, a paradox involving vagueness. The tension here comes from the fact that you can apply two views about a given predicate to the Sorites sequence, such as being bold or again being rich. According to the individualistic take on the Sorites sequence, the existence of a boundary is denied: each successor in the series is supposed to have the same truth value as his predecessor. Whereas according to the collectivistic view of the sequence, there seems to be a boundary somewhere: you clearly see that there are bold men at the one side and that there are the ones with abundant hair on the other side as you take a look at their row. Again, we face a tension and thereby a kind of contradiction, which gives us an impression that we have to do with a paradox. If we now ask whether (B) involves a contradiction, and so whether it happens to be a paradox, one can say that involuntary and voluntary sides of belief succeed in quite different environments, the first one having to do with belief-formation and the second one

with entertaining belief in a view of that one being a reason for possible action. There is a puzzling *tension* here between these two roles, but no outright contradictory feeling of facing a malign kind of contradiction. One is rather in front of a *puzzle*. Paradox may have several solutions, whereas puzzle that you encounter has normally just one that is appropriate. Facing puzzle you encounter an arrangement where at the first time you cannot tell the solution. But once as you intuit the needed pattern through your insightful activity, you have got it. "Knock knock, who's there?"

### **The Broad Reach of Belief Puzzle**

At a first glance belief puzzle presents itself as a kind of curiosity, without a broader reach or teaching being involved into it. But a closer encounter with its nature shows otherwise. As we have indicated there is a tension in belief between (i) *belief-formation* and between (ii) *belief entertaining* in view of providing possible reasons for action. The difference between these is that the first one happens in the *space of causes*, and the second one in the *space of reasons*, if we use the distinction introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. Belief-formation may be considered as alien to the causal realm at the first sight -- for beliefs are psychological and so they seem exclusively reasons related. This is true about belief *entertaining*. But notice that as far as belief-formation goes -- and this is the first point -- we are talking about factual beliefs, such as the already mentioned beliefs forthcoming as the upshot of perceptual experiences. If I form belief about the cat as based upon my observing cat walking in my garden, this happens on the basis of my causal encounter with it. It may be said that even granted this, there has to be psychological impact of my *categorization* ability which allowed me to form belief about the cat. So perceptual belief cannot really depend predominantly upon causal relations. Notice again however that the impact of perceptual categorization is causal in the sense that it succeeds without that our will or deliberation would be decisively involved into it. Seeing the cat, I immediately get the information that it is a cat indeed. So there is no deliberation, and certainly no lengthy deliberation basically involved here. My formerly accumulated knowledge about matters in the world allows me to categorize the item as a cat. The triggered category involving dispositions shed their light upon the scene. It may have been that as I encountered the cat for the first time I waited for a while and deliberated, considering this new hypothesis. But the accumulated dispositional knowledge that I just used in the situation at hand was active in what may be specified as causal direct reflex-like manner. Background knowledge that helps me categorize a certain content, and thereby form belief figuring that content, exercises its effectivity causally, without deliberation for most of cases. In this *causal* manner it *chromatically illuminates* the encountered scene, categorizing items in it. The dispositionally accumulated holistic background knowledge, everything that one knows, is *morphological content*. It is not occurrent content, but content that is there waiting in the weights of the system, if one may use connectionist way of talking. Being of *dispositional* nature, the categorizing process in perceptual situations behaves *reflex-like*, and this means in *causal* manner as far as the nature of the mental allows for it. In Quine's terminology, we deal with standing and not with occurrent beliefs. The just mentioned beliefs are lurking in the *morphological content* cognitive background, and they exercise their *causal* impact upon the encountered situation. Notice that this way of complying to constraints proper to the space of causes is what determined the third person point of view approach in

analytic philosophy as it followed behaviorist tradition. The causal impact of morphological content is in value for belief-*formation*. There are no reasons really involved here, one basically just registers the information. But one can *entertain* one's belief, and this is where *reason* for possible action may come from. This is now the *occurrent* belief which displays disposition for one's action. There is difference here in respect to the standing belief which one deals with in belief-*formation*.

The belief related *puzzle* figuring involuntary belief-formation happening in the space of causes on the one side, and a possible action directed belief entertaining in the space of reasons on the other side may be compared to a predominant tension in practicing philosophical inquiry as we nowadays know it. Opposing philosophical orientations in the twentieth century pushed this tension in direction of *incompatible* or malign *contradiction*. Before this such tension existed in compatibilist form, providing a productive basis for philosophical enterprise through the inclusive disjunction approach. Sellars opposition is useful for distinguishing two directions in which philosophy gets practiced. What is known as analytical tradition in the twentieth century philosophy embraced space of causes as its predominant environment. Vienna circle endorsed scientific approach in philosophy where the aim was to analyze concepts and then to ground the outcome in an empiricist verifiable manner, following therewith a broadly construed methodology of science. Ultimate foundations were empirical data with the intention to systematize them in scientific theory. As Carnap's disciple Quine insisted, the way to go is from empirical data gathered at the sensory surfaces up to the realm of scientific theories. Causally secured environment has its advantage with this approach. On the other hand, there is the so called continental approach in philosophy which predominantly built upon the space of reasons, so that a main characteristics is finding a proper *style*, possibly in a *poetic* realm, this being combined with deep ontology. Style and poetry are manners of putting reasons into one's narrative itinerary. Whereas deep ontology such as proposed by Heidegger, does not happen in causal realm but rather in reasons involving epistemic and practical environment. Notice that Heidegger proposed a practical and engaged view of intentionality, so that causal impact with its preparatory analytic seriousness gets dismissed. Style goes along with *writing* experience. Everything is supposed to make sense; the meaning is forthcoming through individual reasons, and is opposed to analytic rigor. This is a very quick introduction to the situation that philosophy took in the twentieth century, with its opposition between analytic and continental ways to proceed. If we now use the space of causes inspired belief-formation and the space of reasons inspired belief entertaining in view of possible action, we see that the two mentioned directions come as opposed in analytic and continental traditions. The first one concentrates upon the third person point of view, and the second one upon the first person point of view. The main questionable matter in this opposition is that it made divergent whatever by its nature perhaps does not need to be treated in an exclusivist manner. Before the split of these ways to proceed, there existed an *inclusive* way of practicing philosophy. Brentano as a precursor of what followed<sup>5</sup> endorsed both scientific and thus causally inspired approach in philosophy, together

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<sup>5</sup> Horgan, Potrč and Tienson eds 2002. Brentanian tradition involved both scientific and experimental psychology: whereas Brentano had a plan to establish experimental psychological laboratory, Meinong indeed succeeded to form the first one in Austria, where Benussi as the beginner of the Italian experimental psychology started his career. Simultaneously, Brentano and his followers had an interest in consciousness,

with reasons embracing investigation of conscious experiences. He had an interest in psychology as empirical science, which is a causally supported matter. But he as well bought first person point of view consciousness and intentionality style inspired approach. Mach as *precursor* of Vienna circle was both physicist and the one who introduced zero-point perspective. Russell proposed his theory of descriptions as refusal of Meinong's manner to treat existence, so there existed an interaction between what may nowadays be taken as opposed approaches. During most of the twentieth century people subscribed to exclusivist ways to go, so that analytic philosophy space of causes enterprise was separated from the style involving continental space of reasons philosophy. Separatism and exclusivity brought both of approaches over the edge. But as just stated the two strands appeared in *inclusivist* form before their split. And there is their coming together in the current post-analytic philosophy, where analytic causally inspired themes are combined with reasons, phenomenology and consciousness involving first person perspective. This may be taken as broader background figuring what supports belief-formation causally based and belief entertainment reasons inspired difference. Our take on this is *compatibilist*, along the rails of *inclusive disjunction* strategy. This is the pattern with the promise of solving belief puzzle. Seen from this angle, belief is one single phenomenon which proceeds in phases. First it has to be formed, which succeeds in the space of causes. But once as it is there already it exercises its impact in the space of reasons. Belief is treated as something that we ourselves are committed to, and not as something that succeeds in causal realm. Although belief-formation took place in precisely such an environment.

The broad opposition between causal and reasonish side that belief puzzle makes us think about may be illustrated further. System I is a direct reflex-like psychological mechanism that may be described in causal manner. Whereas the higher cognition and deliberation involving System II operates in the space of reasons. The first one is close to the space of causes along with belief-formation, whereas for the second one beliefs are entertained as possible reasons for action, thus operating in a normative and agency directed environment.

Another illustration comes from my review of the divergence between theory of descriptions as the model of high church analytic philosophy and between the communication-intention approach to the same problem. The analytic strand tries to causally ground referential relation, whereas communication-intention approach gets inspired by the space of reasons, so that performative effect of the referring act comes with agentive inspiration. Compatibilist way to go reconciles them both.

Let me summarize the broader background of causal and reasonish trends involved into belief puzzle. Analytic and continental philosophical traditions come as opposed. But we now live in post-analytic period of time, with some paths coming together, which is fortunate given that before their split the environment involved common roots. Poli and Albertazzi repeatedly stressed that the future of philosophy lies in the middle-european empiricist psychology, consciousness and intentionality involving tradition. The separatist approach has it otherwise. Quine proposed epistemology naturalized and provided value of a bound variable as the criterion for being, for what it means to be. Heidegger on the other hand conceived being as the

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intentionality and other favored themes of contemporary continental philosophy. There was substantial interaction between Meinong and Russell; in fact the later's theory of definite descriptions was an answer to the theory of Meinongian objects.



peak of the deep ontology. There is huge divergence of style between analytic and continental traditions, the first embracing scientific and the second deeply substantial and sometimes action involved orientation. This is just to illustrate that belief-formation with its directedness towards the objectivity of the world and towards truth is in vicinity of *causal*, basically scientific approach. Whereas entertaining of belief that can serve as a reason for possible action is closer to normative and existential decisions having to do with rational choice.

## **Phenomenology**

Belief puzzle (B) combines two strands that we take to form sides of a single phenomenon, the phenomenon of belief. This we propose from the *compatibilist inclusive disjunction* perspective, according to which causal and reason-ish realm do not exclude each other, but offer mutual support. This does not promise to improve our belief related practices, but hopefully to shed some explanatory light upon them.

We will address belief puzzle (B) through *phenomenological experience*. If something happens involuntarily, or again is pursued in a voluntary manner, one experiences it in some way in either of these cases. There is phenomenological experience that is characteristic for belief entertainment, which is easy to understand. But on the other hand there is as well phenomenological experience that goes along with belief-formation, as we began to sketch it.

What is phenomenology? One may distinguish between broader and narrower characteristics: "(1) the grammar and logic of moral thought and discourse; (2) people's 'critical practices' regarding moral thought and discourse (e.g., the assumption that genuine moral disagreements are possible), and (3) the what-it-is-like features of concrete moral experiences" (Horgan and Timmons 2005: 57). We concentrate upon the last of these characteristics while dealing with the voluntariness or involuntariness and with agency. We look at what *seems* to be the case to the one who is engaged into belief-formation and into deliberating a possible action on the basis of belief once this one gets formed. How does one qualitatively experience belief-formation? And how does one experience one's possible or actual acting upon the basis of one's beliefs?

Puzzle (B) already talks about phenomenological experience of beliefs once as one possesses them. One treats them as one's own property, as one's intellectual, rational property. This is the qualitative feeling about the beliefs that one has, supporting one's possible agentic engagement upon this basis. But how does one phenomenologically experience episodes of belief-formation? And, does one experience the clash between these? The preliminary answer may be that there is no such experience. The puzzle (B) is thus not experienced but rather just approached from our side in an objective third person point of view manner. People usually do not feel tension as they act on the basis of beliefs they entertain, being compelled to do so. But phenomenological experience becomes important in evaluation of involuntariness and voluntary agency involved into belief-formation and in the practical pursuit of their direction.

Belief-formation happens in the space of causes, as we have already indicated, both in respect to the causal relation in which one stands, triggering one's perceptual belief that we take as our simple example of factual belief, and also in respect to reflex-like and immediate causal effectivity of categorizing impact in respect to the items recognized in the encountered scene. Belief-formation matters are of course psychological, given that belief is a psychological

category. But belief-formation is causal in both encounter with items in the world, and in dispositional response of the background holistic beliefs. These dispositional categorization capabilities react in a causal-like sensation response manner in their encounter with the perceived scene. Standing beliefs that are there in the morphological content react as *if* they would be kind of *causal reasons*. This seems to be a contradiction, unless we embrace a compatibilist inclusive disjunction methodology. In belief-formation *standing* dispositional beliefs *chromatically illuminate* the encountered scene, acting thus as *reasons* to categorize items, but in a causal manner.

In our formulation of puzzle (B) we have linked *belief entertaining* to the space of reasons, saying that beliefs are “phenomenologically experienced as inhabiting one’s rational space of reasons”. In fact, we have provided belief *entertaining* in direction of a possible reason for action as being so phenomenologically experienced. We have now seen as well that belief-formation, even as it happens in the space of causes, has an important impact upon phenomenological experience, if nothing else through the causally forthcoming categorization in form of *chromatic illumination*. Categories provide reflex-like and causally acting quasi-reasons in belief-formation. Phenomenological approach clearly fits to belief *entertaining*, but it also matches some important inclines in belief-formation. A compatibilist and not anymore exclusivist way to go now comes with it.

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